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A. Introduction: The increasingly contentious nature 
of the trade and privacy interface 
Privacy and trade law have developed independently from each 
other, as their objectives and the tools of achieving those objectives are 
profoundly different. Privacy protection can be framed as an individual 
right, as the article explains in more detail below, while trade law 
enables the flow of goods, services, capital, and less so of people across 
borders.1 While both have their origins in the aftermath of World War 
 
* Mira Burri is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Lucerne, Switzerland. She is also the Principal Investigator of the 
research project “The Governance of Big Data in Trade Agreements.” 
1. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Smith, The Public’s Need for Disclosure v. The 
Individual’s Right to Financial Privacy: An Introduction to the Financial 
Right to Privacy Act of 1978, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 513 (1980); William 
M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBLEMS 253, 254 (1966). 
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II,2 with one providing for individual rights’ protection against the 
state3 and the other securing peace by regulating economic relations,4 
the rule-frameworks and the institutions created in the two domains 
are very different. The interfaces between privacy protection and trade 
law and the underlying tensions between sovereignty and international 
cooperation have not been common for a long time; neither have they 
been addressed in the legal frameworks.5 The topic of privacy has not 
been one of the classic trade law treatises,6 and privacy textbooks have 
equally rarely thought of trade law.7 While there has been a robust 
scholarly and policy debate on the impact of the “hard” rules of 
international economic law on non-economic interests,8 privacy has 
seldom been one of the major concerns and fields of contestation.9 
 
2. See Robert E. Baldwin, The Changing Nature of U.S. Trade Policy Since 
WWII, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE 
POLICY 5, 15–16 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1984). 
3. See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS 148 (2012). 
4. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier, The Legitimacy of WTO, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF GLOBALISATION 11–48 (Linda Y. Yueh ed., 2009). 
5. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 makes no 
reference to privacy and most of the free trade agreements up to very 
recently make no mention of it. See, e.g., Graham Greenleaf, Looming 
Free Trade Agreements Pose Threats to Privacy, 152 PRIVACY L. & BUS. 
INT’L REP. 23, 23 (2018). 
6. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed. 1989); 
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 2013); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998); 
WTO – TRADE IN GOODS (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2011). 
7. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW (7th ed. 2014); THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION: A COMMENTARY (Christopher Kuner et al. eds., 2020). 
8. See, e.g., Andrew T. F. Lang, Reflecting on “Linkage”: Cognitive and 
Institutional Change in The International Trading System, 70 THE 
MODERN L. REV. 523, 548 (2007); INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (Frederick M. Abbott 
et al. eds., 2006); THE WTO AND LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (Drusilla 
K. Brown & Robert M. Stern eds., 2007); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO (Geert Van Calster & Denise 
Prévost eds., 2013); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
TRADE LAW (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2016). 
9. But see, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The 
Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. 
Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2000); Gregory Shaffer, 
Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of 
New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual 
Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 29 
(2002). 
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The interface between trade and privacy protection became 
relevant because of technological advances, which permitted the easy 
flow of information across borders and exposed the existing tensions.10 
During the late 1970s and the 1980s, as satellites, computers and 
software changed the dynamics of communications, the trade-offs 
between allowing data to flow freely and asserting national jurisdiction 
became readily apparent.11 Some states, echoing the concerns of large 
multinational companies, started to worry that barriers to information 
flows may seriously hinder economic activities and thus looked for 
mechanisms that could prevent the erection of such barriers.12 It was 
clear that some sort of a balancing mechanism was needed. Such a 
mechanism was found, in a soft legal form, in the principles elaborated 
under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”).13 However, the OECD framework, which is 
briefly discussed later in this article, provided the bare minimum and 
readily permitted diverging approaches of data protection, such as those 
of the European Union (“EU”) and the United States (“US”).14 
Moreover, as the OECD itself points out, while this privacy framework 
endured, the situation in the 1970s and 1980s is profoundly different 
from the challenges in the realm of data governance we face today.15 
Pervasive digitization and powerful hardware, coupled with the societal 
embeddedness of the Internet, have changed the volume, the intensity, 
and the nature of data flows.16  
 
10. See, e.g., Christopher Kuner, Regulation of Transborder Data Flows 
Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present and Future, 8 
(OECD Digital Economy Papers, Working Paper No. 187, 2011); Susan 
Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements Are Not Setting Information Free: 
The Lost History and Reinvigorated Debate Over Cross-Border Data 
Flows, Human Rights and National Security, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 
671, 672 (2015). 
11. Aaronson, supra note 10, at 672. 
12. Id. at 673–74. 
13. Guidelines for the Protection of Personal Information and Transborder 
Data Flows of Personal Data ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-





15. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
[OECD], The OECD Privacy Framework (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3H2D-R6RE] [hereinafter OECD, Privacy Framework]. 
16. See James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, 
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The value of data and Big Data,17 as well as the risks associated 
with data collection, data processing, its use and re-use — by both 
companies and governments — has dramatically changed. On one hand, 
data has become so essential to economic processes that it is considered 
the “new oil.”18 Although this concept is flawed, since data is not 
exhaustible and may lose its usefulness over time,19 it aptly shows the 
high value associated with it. Like other factors of production, such as 
natural resources and human capital, it appears that much of modern 
economic activities, innovation and growth cannot occur without 
data.20 Emerging technologies, like Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), are 
highly dependent on data inputs as well, so the future of the data-
driven economy is, in many aspects, at stake.21 Many studies have 
 
rontier%20for%20innovation/MGI_big_data_full_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KG5U-VGEB]; VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM 
HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy 
Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. 
King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393 (2014). 
17. There are no clear definitions of small versus Big Data. Definitions vary 
and scholars seem to agree that the term of Big Data is generalized and 
slightly imprecise. One common identification of Big Data is through its 
characteristics of volume, velocity, and variety, also referred to as the “3-
Vs.” Increasingly, experts add a fourth “V” that relates to the veracity or 
reliability of the underlying data and fifth one with regard to its value. 
See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 16, at 13. For a brief 
introduction to Big Data applications and review of the literature, see 
Mira Burri, Understanding the Implications of Big Data and Big Data 
Analytics for Competition Law: An Attempt for a Primer, in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPETITION BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
241–263 (Klaus Mathis & Avishalom Tor eds., 2019). 
18. David Parkins, The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, 




19. Amongst other arguments, see Burri, supra note 17, for a full analysis; 
see Lauren Henry Scholz, Big Data Is Not Big Oil: The Role of Analogy 
in the Law of New Technologies, 86 TENN. L. REV. 863 (2019). 
20. Manyika et al., supra note 16. 
21. See Kristina Irion & Josephine Williams, Prospective Policy Study on 
Artificial Intelligence and EU Trade Policy, AMSTERDAM: THE INST. FOR 
INFO. L., 31–32 (2019); see generally The Royal Society, Machine 
Learning: The Power and Promise of Computers That Learn by Example 
(2017); Anupam Chander, Artificial Intelligence and Trade, in BIG DATA 
AND GLOBAL TRADE LAW 115–127 (Mira Burri ed., 2021). 
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revealed the vast potential of data,22 and companies as well as 
governments are seeking to realize this potential.23  
On the other hand, increased dependence on data has brought 
about a new set of concerns. Scholars and policymakers alike have 
widely acknowledged the impact of data collection and its use upon 
privacy as has been felt by regular users of digital products and 
services.24 The risks have only been augmented in the era of Big Data 
and AI, which presents certain distinct challenges to the protection of 
personal data and by extension to the protection of personal and family 
life.25 For example, Big Data questions the very distinction between 
personal and non-personal data as citizens become “transparent.”26 On 
one hand, it appears that one of the basic tools of data protection — 
that of anonymization, i.e. the process of removing identifiers to create 
anonymized datasets — is only of limited utility in a data-driven world, 
as it is now rare for data generated by user activity to be completely 
 
22. See, e.g., Manyika et al., supra note 16; MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
CUKIER, supra note 16; Nicolaus Henke et al., The Age of Analytics: 






23. See, e.g., Manyika et al., supra note 16; Henke et al., supra note 22; 
Jacques Bughin et al., Digital Europe: Pushing the Frontier, Capturing 





24. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1766–67 (2010); Paul 
M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 
1854 (2011); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy 
and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. OF TECH. AND 
INTELL. PROP. 239, 264 (2013); John Podesta et al., Big Data: Seizing 
Opportunities, Preserving Values, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, (May 2014) https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=752636 
[https://perma.cc/K42N-UXFA]; Urs Gasser, Recoding Privacy Law: 
Reflections on the Future Relationship Among Law, Technology, and 
Privacy, 130 HARV. L. REV. 61, 65 (2016). See Colin J. Bennett & Robin 
M. Bayley, Privacy Protection in the Era of ‘Big Data’: Regulatory 
Challenges and Social Assessments, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
BIG DATA 205, 215–23 (Bart van der Sloot et al. eds., 2016); Sheri B. 
Pan, Get to Know Me: Protecting Privacy and Autonomy Under Big 
Data’s Penetrating Gaze, 30 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 239, 244 (2016). 
25. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 24, at 1748. 
26. Joel R. Reidenberg, The Transparent Citizen, 47 LOYOLA UNIV. 
CHICAGO L. J. 437, 438–48 (2015). 
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and irreversibly anonymized.27 On the other hand, Big Data analytics 
enable the re-identification of data subjects by combining datasets of 
non-personal data, especially as data is persistent and can be retained 
indefinitely.28 Big Data also casts doubt on the efficacy of existing 
privacy protection laws, which often operate upon requirements of 
transparency and user consent.29 Data minimization is another core idea 
of privacy protection that has been challenged, as firms are “hungry” 
to get hold of more data, and the sources of data from smart devices, 
sensors, and social networks’ interactions multiply.30 These challenges 
are not unnoticed and have triggered the reform of data protection laws 
around the world, best evidenced by the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”).31 However, these reform initiatives are not 
coherent and are culturally and socially embedded, reflecting societies’ 
deep understandings of constitutional values, relationships between 
citizens and the state, and the role of the market, as illustrated with a 
discussion of the differences in approaches between the US and the EU 
to data protection that follows later in this article. 
The tensions around data have also revived older questions about 
sovereignty and international cooperation in cyberspace.32 Although 
there has been an agreement, as maintained in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber-Operations (“Tallinn 
2.0”),33 that cyberspace does not change the nature of jurisdiction and 
“[s]ubject to limitations set forth in international law, a State may 
 





28. Podesta et al., supra note 24, at 14–15; see also Ohm, supra note 24, at 
1704; Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New 
Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 74, 77 (2013). 
29. Rubinstein, supra note 28, at 78. 
30. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 24, at 241. 
31. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
32. For a great review of the theories on cyberspace regulation, their evolution 
over time and review of the literature, see Kristen E. Eichensehr, The 
Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L. J. 317, 331–34 (2015). 
33. See generally INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION 
OF THE NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF 
EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER-OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2nd ed., 
2017). See also Eric T. Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and 
Insights, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 736, 746–60 (2017). 
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exercise territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction over cyber 
activities,”34 the application of this rule has not been easy in practice.35 
As the Tallinn 2.0 drafters themselves pointed out, “determining 
whether enforcement jurisdiction is territorial or extraterritorial can be 
complex in the cyber context”36 and the nature of data and data flows 
only exacerbate this problem.37 Data’s intangibility and pervasiveness 
pose particular difficulties for determining where data is located, as bits 
of data, even those associated with a single transaction or online 
activity, can be located anywhere.38 Even in relatively straightforward 
situations, where the data is simply located on a server abroad, the 
application of national law can be tricky, as clearly demonstrated by 
US v. Microsoft.39 The extraterritorial application of court judgments 
can also be highly problematic, as illustrated by some well-known 
decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), 
such as Google Spain,40 and more recently, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. 
 
34. See INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE 
NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, supra 
note 33, at 51. 
35. See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Data Extraterritoriality, 95 TEX. L. REV. 
145 (2017). 
36. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE 
NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, supra 
note 33, at 69. 
37. See id.  
38. See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 35, at 145. 
39. United States v. Microsoft Corp. 584 U.S. ___, 138 (2018) was a data 
privacy case involving the extraterritoriality of law enforcement seeking 
electronic data under the 1986 Stored Communications Act (SCA), Title 
II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, id. In 2013, 
Microsoft challenged a warrant by the federal government to turn over 
email of a target account that was stored in Ireland, arguing that a 
warrant issued under Section 2703 of the SCA could not compel US 
companies to produce data stored in servers abroad, id. Microsoft initially 
lost in the Southern District of New York, with the judge stating that the 
nature of the Stored Communication Act warrant, as passed in 1986, was 
not subject to territorial limitations, id. Microsoft appealed to the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who found in favor of Microsoft 
and invalidated the warrant in 2016, id. In response, the Department of 
Justice appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which 
decided to hear the appeal, id. While the case was pending, Congress 
passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), 
which amended the SCA to resolve concerns from the government and 
Microsoft related to the initial warrant. The US Supreme Court, following 
agreement from the government and Microsoft, determined the passage 
of the CLOUD Act and a new warrant for the data filed under it made 
the case moot and vacated the Second Circuit’s decision. 
40. Case C‑131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 
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Facebook,41 as well as the Equustek decision from the Supreme Court 
of Canada.42 
With the increased value of data, the associated risks, and 
contentious jurisdictional issues, governments have sought new ways to 
 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014). The Google Spain case coined the 
infamous “right to be forgotten.” Under the 1995 EU Data Protection 
Directive, the CJEU ruled that a search engine is regarded as a 
“controller” with respect to “processing” of personal data through its act 
of locating, indexing, storing, and disseminating such information. It also 
held that in order to guarantee the rights of privacy and the protection 
of personal data, search engines operators can be required to remove 
personal information published by third party websites. In a follow-up 
judgement, the CJEU did limit the geographic scope of the “right to be 
forgotten” and help that it should be applicable to EU citizens. See Case 
C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019). 
41. Case C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct., 3, 2019). This is a defamation case that was 
about the liability of intermediaries. The case arose in 2016 when an 
anonymous Facebook user shared an article and a defamatory comment 
against the applicant Eva Glawischnig–Piesczek, an Austrian Green Party 
politician. The case was referred to the CJEU, which found that the E-
Commerce Directive does not preclude a Member State from ordering a 
hosting provider to remove or block content that has been declared 
unlawful, or content that is identical or equivalent to such unlawful 
information. The Court also held that the Directive does not preclude 
Member states from ordering such removal worldwide, and therefore left 
it to the Member States to determine the geographic scope of the 
restriction within the framework of the relevant national and international 
laws. 
42. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.). This 
is an IP case, where the Court found that Canadian courts could grant a 
global injunction against a non-party to litigation when the order is fair 
and equitable in the circumstances of the case, id. The Supreme Court 
was unconvinced by Google’s arguments that a global de-indexing order 
would offend international comity, would unreasonably inconvenience 
the search engine, and would interfere with the right to freedom of 
expression, id. The case is now being continued in the US, where the US 
District Court of Northern California granted Google a temporary 
injunction blocking the enforceability of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
order in the United States. See, e.g., Alica Loh, Google v. Equustek: 
United States Federal Court Declares Canadian Court Order 
Unenforceable, JOLT DIGEST, HARV. L. (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/google-v-equustek-united-states-
federal-court-declares-canadian-court-order-unenforceable 
[https://perma.cc/W7EH-ESVF]. The California Court granted the 
injunction on the basis that the company was protected as a neutral 
intermediary under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
1996, id. It also said that “the Canadian order undermines the policy 
goals of Section 230 and threatens free speech on the global internet.” 
Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 182194, at *8 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 2, 2017). It is expected that 
Google will apply to make the injunction permanent. 
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assert control over it — in particular by prescribing diverse measures 
that “localize” the data to keep it within one state’s sovereign space.43 
However, erecting barriers to data flows impinges directly on trade and 
may also endanger the realization of an innovative data economy.44 The 
provision of any digital products and services, cloud computing 
applications, or the development of the Internet of Things (“IoT”) and 
AI are impossible under restrictions on cross-border flows of data.45 
Data protectionism may also be associated with certain costs for the 
economy that endorses it.46  
Overall, with the increased role of data in societies, the interfaces 
between trade and privacy protection have grown and intensified, thus 
raising important questions regarding adequate regulatory design that 
reconciles economic and non-economic concerns along with national and 
international interests. This article is set against this complex backdrop 
and seeks to provide a better understanding and contextualization of 
the theme of data protection and its interfaces with global trade law. 
First, this article looks at the existing international, transnational, and 
selected national frameworks for privacy protection and their evolution 
over time. The article then explores the application of the rules of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to situations where privacy 
concerns may be affected. This article then looks at the data-relevant 
and data protection rules that have emerged in preferential trade 
venues with a focus on reconciliation mechanisms. Finally, the article 
concludes with some thoughts on the pros and cons of the available 
legal solutions for reconciling trade and privacy protection and provides 
an outlook on this contentious relationship and its possible resolution.  
 
43. See Anupam Chander, National Data Governance in a Global Economy, 
495 UC DAVIS L. STUD. RSCH. PAPER 1, 2 (2016); see also Anupam 
Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L. J. 677, 690 
(2015). 
44. Digital Trade in the US and Global Economies, Part 1, Inv. No. 332–531, 
USITC Pub. 4415 (July 2013); Digital Trade in the US and Global 
Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 332–540, USITC Pub. 4485 (Aug. 2014). For 
a country survey, see Chander & Lê, supra note 43. 
45. See Chander, supra note 43, at 2. 
46. See, e.g., Martina F. Ferracane, The Costs of Data Protectionism, (Oct. 
25, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/cost-data-protectionism 
[https://perma.cc/D7W2-BTMA]; Martina F. Ferracane, The Costs of 
Data Protectionism, in BIG DATA AND GLOBAL TRADE LAW 63–82 (Mira 
Burri ed., 2021); Richard D. Taylor, “Data localization”: The Internet in 
the Balance, 44 TELECOMM. POL’Y (2020). For an opposing opinion, see 
Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, Pitching Trade against Privacy: 
Reconciling EU Governance of Personal Data Flows with External Trade, 
10 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 201 (2020). 
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B. Legal frameworks for the protection of privacy 
I. International rules for the protection of privacy 
International law establishes the right to privacy, which is now 
commonly referred to as one of the fundamental rights to which every 
human being should be entitled.47 The core privacy principle can be 
found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”),48 and privacy rights were given formal legal protection in 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).49 Article 17 guaranteed individuals protection of their 
personal sphere as broadly conceived.50 However, this protection has 
not been robust. Some scholars have shown, by looking at the 
negotiation histories of the UDHR and the ICCPR, that the right to 
privacy as an umbrella term almost accidentally found its way into the 
treaties and was only later enshrined in national constitutions.51 Over 
the years, the international framework for privacy has expanded, in 
particular due to the effects of new technologies and the new perils they 
may bring to data protection.52 Despite the fact that the Human Rights 
Committee has not yet developed a specific set of obligations in the 
domain of privacy law, it did recognize some of its core aspects, such 
as that personal information ought to be protected against both public 
authorities and private entities, the need for data security, the right of 
data subjects to be informed about the processing of their data, and 
the right to rectification or elimination of unlawfully obtained or 
inaccurate data.53 In 1990, the UN General Assembly also adopted 
 
47. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 
12 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
48. Id. (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”). 
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S 1057. 
50. The text of Article 17 is identical to Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, but the two sentences are framed as 
separate paragraphs. See id. at art. 17; see GA Res. 217 (III), supra note 
47, at art. 12. 
51. See Oliver Diggelmann & Maria N. Cleis, How the Right to Privacy 
Became a Human Right, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441, 446–47 (2014). 
52. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
[OECD], The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, at 7–8, OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 176 (Apr. 
6, 2011) [hereinafter The Evolving Privacy Landscape]. 
53. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 
(Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and 
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, ¶ 10 (Apr. 
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Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files 
(“Guidelines”)54 that stipulate minimum guarantees and include certain 
key principles of data protection, such as lawfulness, fairness, accuracy, 
purpose-specification, relevance and adequacy of data collection and 
processing, and data security.55 However, the Guidelines are non-
binding and states may depart from the mentioned principles for 
reasons of national security, public order, public health or morality, and 
the rights of others.56 More recently, the appointed UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy57 discussed his efforts to develop 
an international legal instrument regarding surveillance and privacy;58 
yet such an instrument has still not materialized.  
The Council of Europe (“CoE”) has played an important role in 
the evolution of the international regime by endorsing stronger and 
enforceable standards of human rights’ protection in its 47 members 
through the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”),59 
and through case-law developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”) on Article 8.60 This jurisprudence not only stressed 
 
8, 1988), https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZEE-JNJN]. 
54. See generally G.A. Res. 45/95 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
55. See id.  
56. See id. ¶ 6. 
57. The Special Rapporteur is an independent expert appointed by the 
Human Rights Council to examine and report back on a country 
situation and on the specific right to privacy. In July 2015, the Human 
Rights Council appointed Prof. Joseph Cannataci of Malta as the first-
ever Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy. On the position and the 
specific mandate, see Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, U.N. 
HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/privacy/sr/pages/srprivacyindex.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/P9AT-V2P8].  
58. See Joseph A. Cannataci, Games People Play: Unvarnished Insights about 
Privacy at the Global Level, in DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY UNDER 
PRESSURE 13, 13–48 (Gert Vermeulen & Eva Lievens eds., 2017).  
59. The text of the ECHR and the additional protocols and their signatories 
are available on the European Court of Human Rights’ website. See 
generally European Convention on Human Rights, EUR. CT. OF HUM. 
RTS https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c= 
[https://perma.cc/HSS3-SLGF].  
60. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“(1) Everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
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the obligations of states to protect an individual’s privacy rights, but 
also clarified the limitations of the right imposed either by key public 
interests or the rights of others.61 Different aspects of data protection 
were further endorsed through a number of CoE resolutions and 
Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (“Convention 108”), which 
opened for signature in 1981 and was last amended in 2018.62 
Convention 108 is the first international instrument that established 
minimum standards for personal data protection in a legally binding 
manner.63 Convention 108 is also open for accession to non-CoE 
members — so far, nine countries have joined and others have observer-
status.64 
II. Transnational rules for the protection of privacy: The OECD and 
the APEC frameworks 
As mentioned previously, the OECD was the first organization to 
endorse principles of privacy protection by recognizing both the need 
to facilitate trans-border data flows as a basis for economic and social 
development and the related risks. 65 The 1980 OECD Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(“OECD Guidelines”)66 sought to achieve this balance by (1) agreeing 
upon certain basic principles of national and international application, 
which, while keeping free data flows, permitted legitimate restrictions, 
and (2) by offering bases for national implementation and international 
cooperation.67 The OECD Guidelines endorse eight principles, 
applicable in both the public and the private sector, and also encourage 
countries to develop their own privacy protection frameworks along 
them.68 These eight principles are: (1) collection limitation; (2) data 
 
61. For a comprehensive guide to the jurisprudence, see, e.g., EURO. CT HUM. 
RTS., GUIDE ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE, HOME 
AND CORRESPONDENCE 38–55 (2020).  
62. See generally Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 1496 U.N.T.S. 
66.  
63. See, e.g., EUR. AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. ET AL., HANDBOOK 
ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 15–17 (2018).  
64. Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Senegal, Tunisia, and Uruguay have become members. For details and 
updates, see Data Protection – Convention 108 and Protocols: Parties, 
COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-
protection/convention108/parties [https://perma.cc/M7A9-PB44]. 
65. The Evolving Privacy Landscape, supra note 52, § 7. 
66. OECD, Guidelines for Protections, supra note 13. 
67. Id.  
68. OECD, Privacy Framework, supra note 15. 
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quality; (3) purpose specification; (4) use limitation; (5) security 
safeguards principle; (6) openness; (7) individual participation; and (8) 
accountability.69 These principles have become essential aspects to all 
national data protection regimes that were later developed, including 
the EU framework, which is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
In trying to keep pace with newer technological advances, the OECD 
Guidelines were revised in 2013,70 but these core principles remained 
unaltered.71 The revision added a number of new concepts, including: 
national privacy strategies; privacy management programs; and data 
security breach notification, which allow flexibility in implementation 
while recognizing the newer demands from governments to approach 
data protection as an ever more important topic.72 Two features remain 
key to the OECD Guidelines: the focus on the practical implementation 
of privacy protection through an approach grounded in risk 
management and the need to address the global dimension of privacy 
through improved interoperability.73 
The 2005 APEC Privacy Framework (“Privacy Framework”)74 is 
in many ways similar to the OECD Privacy Guidelines75 because it 
contains a set of principles and implementation guidelines that were 
created to establish effective privacy protection that avoids barriers to 
information flows in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) 
region of 21 countries.76 Building upon the Privacy Framework, APEC 
developed the Cross-Border Privacy Rules (“CBPR”) system, which 
Australia, China Taipei, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, 
Singapore and the United States have formally joined.77 The CBPR 
system does not displace a country’s domestic laws, nor does it demand 
specific changes to them, but rather provides a minimum level of 
 
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. OECD, supra note 13. 
72. See id. 
73. Id.  
74. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY 
FRAMEWORK (2005). 
75. The APEC framework endorses similar to the OECD Privacy Guidelines 
principles: (1) preventing harm; (2) notice; (3) collection limitations; (4) 
use of personal information; (5) choice; (6) integrity of personal 
information; (7) security safeguards; (8) access and correction; and (9) 
accountability. See Graham Greenleaf, The APEC Privacy Initiative: 
“OECD Lite” for the Asia-Pacific?, 71 PRIV. L. & BUS. 16, 16–18 (2004).  
76. See ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY 
FRAMEWORK ¶ 4 (2005). 
77. See About CBPRs, CROSS BORDER PRIVACY RULES SYSTEM, 
http://cbprs.org/about-cbprs/ [https://perma.cc/NF9Z-GBNX].  
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protection through certain compliance and certification mechanisms.78 
It requires that participating businesses develop and implement data 
privacy policies that are consistent with the APEC Privacy 
Framework.79 The APEC Accountability Agents can then assess this 
consistency.80 The CBPR system is, in this sense, analogous to the EU-
US Privacy Shield, which we discuss later, because they both provide a 
means for self-assessment, compliance review, recognition, dispute 
resolution, and enforcement.81 While both the OECD and APEC 
privacy frameworks are non-binding,82 they illustrate the need for 
international cooperation in the field of data protection, as well as the 
importance of cross-border data flows as a foundation of contemporary 
economies.  
III. National approaches for data protection: The European Union 
versus the United States 
1. Data protection in the European Union 
The EU subscribes to a rights-based, omnibus data protection.83 
The right to privacy is a key concept in EU law that lawmakers have 
given significant weight that reflects deep cultural values and 
understandings. Building upon the Council of Europe’s ECHR, which 
protects the right to private and family life,84 the Charter of 
 
78. Alex Wall, International Association of Privacy Professionals, GDPR 
Matchup: The APEC Privacy Framework and Cross-Border Privacy 
Rules, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PRO. (May 31, 2017), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-the-apec-privacy-framework-
and-cross-border-privacy-rules/# [https://perma.cc/XXE9-5A4D].  
79. Id.  
80. See id.  
81. See Nigel Waters, The APEC Asia-Pacific Privacy Initiative: A New 
Route to Effective Data Protection or a Trojan Horse for Self-Regulation, 
6 SCRIPTED 74, 74–89 (2009).  
82. See OECD, supra note 15; Cover Your Assets: APEC’S Privacy 
Framework, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Apr. 17, 2009), 
https://www.apec.org/Press/Features/2009/0417_privacy 
[https://perma.cc/6482-KBV4]. Some scholars have argued that such soft 
law frameworks are nonetheless far-reaching, as their implementation 
depends on the power of reputational constraints as treaties do. See, e.g., 
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It 
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 263–72 (2011).  
83. See, e.g., Christopher F. Mondschein & Cosimo Monda, The EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in a Research Context, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CLINICAL DATA SCIENCE 55, 57 (Peter Kubben et 
al. eds. 2019).  
84. European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221.  
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“CFREU”)85 distinguishes 
between the right of respect for private and family life in Article 7 and 
the right to protection of personal data in Article 8.86 This distinction 
is no coincidence but reflects the heightened concern of the EU and 
translates into a positive duty87 to implement an effective system to 
protect personal data and regulate the transmission of such data.88 The 
1995 Data Protection Directive (“Directive”) formed an important part 
of this ongoing project of the EU.89 As the regulatory environment 
profoundly changed, the use and role of data in the economy demanded 
an update to ensure the needed high level protection of privacy. The 
Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009,90 also prompted the 
more active involvement of the EU as a supranational unity.91 Next to 
this broad underlying need to modernize existing rules and make them 
fit for the new digital space, there were a number of more concrete 
decisions and events that triggered the change, as well as made it 
politically feasible. An important, albeit not directly related, 
development was the revelations made in 2013 by Edward Snowden 
that exposed the breadth and depth of surveillance by the US National 
 
85. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 
389.  
86. Id. at art. 8 (“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her; 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some 
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to 
have it rectified; 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control 
by an independent authority.”). 
87. See generally Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, 
App Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (Feb. 13, 2003). 
See also Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Distinction between 
Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 222, 223–26 (2013). 
88. See id. at 223–24.  
89. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31–50.  
90. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 2, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 
O.J. (C 306) 1. 
91. See Christoher Kuner, The European Commission’s Proposed Data 
Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data 
Protection Law, BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW 
REPORT 1–15 (2012); ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU 
DATA PROTECTION LAW (2015); see also Shaping the EU as We Know 
it: The First 10 Years of the Lisbon Treaty 2000-2010, COUNCIL OF 
THE EUR. UNION, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/lisbon-treaty/ 
[https://perma.cc/EM8T-NAQN]. 
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Security Agency (“NSA”).92 This involved the surveillance’s access to 
the data of millions of private users, from the systems of Google, 
Facebook, Apple and other big (US-based) Internet players.93 
Additionally, a series of seminal decisions of the CJEU brought about 
important changes in existing legal practices, as well as in the overall 
understanding of an individual’s rights to be protected on the Internet 
in Europe — Google Spain, as previously mentioned,94 is perhaps the 
best known in this context, as it coined “the right to be forgotten,” 
which gave priority to privacy over free speech rights and the economic 
rights of the information intermediaries, such as Google search.95 
Another important case was Schrems I, decided on October 6, 2015,96 
which rendered the Safe Harbor Agreement between the EU and the 
US invalid and illuminated the importance of cross-border data flows, 
as well as the difficulties with reconciling it with the fundamental right 
to privacy.97 
The new EU data protection act, the 2018 GDPR, serves the same 
purpose as the 1995 Data Protection Directive and seeks to harmonize 
the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons 
regarding processing activities and to ensure the free flow of personal 
data between EU Member States.98 The GDPR endorses a clear set of 
principles99 and particularly high standards of protection in the form of 
 
92. See Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice 
in a Global Digital Environment, 3 EURO. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 243–51 
(2014).  
93. See, e.g., id. at 243–51.  
94. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).  
95. Id. ¶ 20(3). See also Case C-136/17, GC and Others, EU:C:2019:773 
(Sept. 24, 2019); Case C-507/17, Google v. CNIL, EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 
24, 2019); for a commentary, see, e.g., Jure Globocnick, The Right to be 
Forgotten is Taking Shape: CJEU Judgments in GC and Others (C-
136/17) and Google v. CNIL (C-507/17), 69 GRUR INT’L 380, 380–388 
(2020). 
96. Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015). 
97. See id. 
98. GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 3. 
99. Article 5 of the GDPR specifies that personal data shall be processed 
lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject 
(principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency); collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes (principle of purpose limitation); 
processing must also be adequate, relevant and limited to what is 
necessary (principle of data minimization); as well as accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date (principle of accuracy); data is to be kept in a 
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed 
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enhanced user rights (such as the already mentioned right to be 
forgotten,100 the right to transparent information,101 the right of access 
to personal data,102 the right to data portability,103 the right to object,104 
and the right not to be subject to automated decision-making, including 
profiling).105 The conditions of consent,106 as an essential element for 
making data processing lawful,107 have also been changed to strengthen 
the user’s informational sovereignty. So, for instance, pursuant to 
Article 7 of the GDPR, the request for consent needs to be presented 
in a manner that is clearly distinguishable from others, is in an 
intelligible and easily accessible form, and uses clear and plain 
language.108 Moreover, the data subject has the right to withdraw her 
consent at any time.109 As the GDPR explicitly prescribes: “[i]t shall be 
as easy to withdraw consent as to give it.”110 Additionally, the GDPR 
calls for heightened responsibilities of entities controlling and processing 
data, including data protection by design and by default,111 and 
envisages high penalties for non-compliance.112 
 
(principle of storage limitation); data processing must be secure (principle 
of integrity and confidentiality); and the data controller is to be held 
responsible (principle of accountability). GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 5. 
100. Id. at art. 17. 
101. Id. at art. 12. 
102. Id. at arts. 13–15, 19. 
103. Id. at art. 20. 
104. Id. at art. 21. 
105. Id. at art. 22. 
106. Id. at art. 4(11). Article 4(11) of the GDPR clarifies the concept of 
consent. It states, “consent of the data subject means any freely given, 
specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes 
by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, 
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or 
her.” Id. 
107. Id. at art. 7. There are special conditions applicable to child’s consent. 
The processing of personal data based on consent pursuant to Article 6 
(1) is only lawful, if the child is at least 16 years old, or consent is given 
or authorized by the holder of parental responsibility. Member States can 
provide by law for a lower age, but not below thirteen. Id. at art. 8(1). 
108. Id. at art. 7(2). 
109. See European Data Protection Board [EDPB], Guidelines 05/2020 on 
Consent Under Regulation 2016/679, (May 4, 2020). 
110. GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 7(3). 
111. Id. at art. 25. 
112. See id. at art. 83(5)–(6). Depending on the infringement, data protection 
authorities can impose fines up to 20,000,000 EUR, or in the case of an 
undertaking, up to 4% of its total worldwide annual turnover of the 
preceding financial year, whichever is higher, id. 
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Also noteworthy is the firmer grasp of the GDPR in terms of its 
territorial reach. Article 3(1) specifies the territorial scope as covering 
the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of a controller or a processor in the EU, regardless of 
whether the processing takes place in the EU.113 However, the GDPR 
applies to a controller or processor not established in the EU, when the 
processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, 
irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to 
such data subjects in the EU; or (b) the monitoring of their behavior 
as far as their behavior takes place within the EU.114 This is a 
substantial extension of the scope of EU’s data protection law and is 
bound to have a significant impact in its implementation, potentially 
becoming applicable to many US and other foreign companies targeting 
the EU market.115  
In the context of the extraterritorial application of the GDPR and 
what has been particularly controversial, as exemplified by Schrems I 
and more recently in 2020 by Schrems II,116 is the possibility of the 
European Commission to find that a third country offers “an adequate 
level of data protection.”117 With this, the EU unilaterally evaluates the 
 
113. Id. at art. 3(1) 
114. Id. at art. 3(2). Guidance to determine whether a controller or a processor 
is offering goods or services to EU data subjects is provided in Recital 23 
of the GDPR, as well as in more detail by the European Union’s data 
protection authority, id. at Recital 23. See also European Data Protection 
Board [EDPB], Guidelines 03/2018 on the Territorial Scope of the GDPR 
(Article 3), (Nov. 12, 2019). 
115. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1623 (2013); OMER TENE & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, 
OVEREXTENDED: JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW UNDER THE EU 
GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2013); Mira Burri & Rahel 
Schär, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: Outlining Key 
Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy, 6 J. 
INFO. POL’Y 479 (2016); Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU 
Data Transfer Regulation Post Schrems, 18 GERMAN L. J. 881 (2017). 
116. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximillian 
Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020). 
117. GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 45(1); see also id. ¶¶ 103–104. The adoption 
of an adequacy decision involves a proposal from the European 
Commission; an opinion of the European Data Protection Board; an 
approval from representatives of EU countries; and the adoption of the 
decision by the European Commission. At any time, the European 
Parliament and the Council may request the European Commission to 
maintain, amend or withdraw the adequacy decision on the grounds that 
its act exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the regulation. 
See GDPR supra note 31, at arts. 45(3) & 93(2). The Commission must 
regularly review the adequacy decisions and, where available information 
reveals, that a third country no longer ensures an adequate level of 
protection, repeal, amend or suspend the decision. GDPR, supra note 31, 
at art. 45(5). 
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standards of protection in the partner country. This would mean that 
personal data could flow from the EU (and Norway, Liechtenstein, and 
Iceland, as members of the European Economic Area) to a third country 
without any further safeguards being necessary,118 or in other words, 
transfers to the third country become assimilated to intra-EU 
transmissions of data. The European Commission has so far recognized 
Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organizations), Faroe Islands, 
Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
and Uruguay as having adequate levels of data protection, and has 
ongoing talks with South Korea.119 
The adequacy test was somewhat strengthened post-Schrems I, and 
the Commission should “take into account how a particular third 
country respects the rule of law, access to justice as well as international 
human rights norms and standards and its general and sectoral law, 
including legislation concerning public security, defence and national 
security as well as public order and criminal law.”120 The first country 
subject to an adequacy decision after the adoption of the GDPR was 
Japan.121 In a 58-page decision122 the Commission found, by looking at 
both the levels of protection provided by Japanese general and sectoral 
data protection regulations, as well as the redress and oversight 
mechanisms, that the adequacy standard described in Article 45 of the 
GDPR, “interpreted in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, in particular in the Schrems judgment, is met.”123 
In the absence of an “adequacy decision,” a controller or processor 
may only transfer personal data to a third country only if they provide 
appropriate safeguards, and on condition that enforceable data subject 
 
118. See GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 45(1). See also id. ¶ 103. 
119. Adequacy Decisions, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-
protection/adequacy-decisions_en [https://perma.cc/3ZYR-MRNW]. 
120. GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 45(2). See also id. ¶ 104.  
121. GDPR Brief: Japan obtains the first adequacy agreement under the 
GDPR, Glob. All. for Geonomics & Health (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.ga4gh.org/news/gdpr-brief-japan-obtains-the-first-
adequacy-agreement-under-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/RG9A-PS2A]. 
Negotiations are ongoing with South Korea and many of the existing 
adequacy decisions are up to renewal. Negotiations are ongoing with 
South Korea and many of the existing adequacy decisions are up to 
renewal. See, e.g., Adequacy Decisions, supra note 119.  
122. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419 of 23 January 2019 
Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data by Japan 
Under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, 2019 O.J. (C 
304) 1. 
123. Id. ¶ 175. 
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rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available.124 
Such appropriate safeguards may be provided for by: (a) a legally 
binding and enforceable instrument between public authorities or 
bodies; (b) binding corporate rules; (c) standard data protection clauses 
adopted by the Commission; (d) standard data protection clauses 
adopted by a supervisory authority and approved by the Commission; 
(e) an approved code of conduct with binding and enforceable 
commitments; or (f) an approved certification together with binding 
and enforceable commitments.125 While the GDPR brings more clarity 
and certainty with regard to these clauses, they are still related to 
higher costs and provide only a second-best option.126 Overall, under 
the EU data protection regime, priority is given to privacy protection 
over economic rights. The EU also seeks to “export” these higher 
standards by either binding individual countries through the adequacy 
decision or applying EU law to foreign businesses that use EU citizens’ 
data under the GDPR.127 
2. Data protection in the United States 
The US shares a fundamentally different idea of privacy protection, 
which is deeply rooted in its history and understood as protection of 
liberty.128 The US “focuses more on restrictions, such as the Fourth 
Amendment, that protect citizens from information collection and use 
by government rather than private actors. In fact, private actors are 
often protected from such restrictions by the First Amendment.”129 In 
 
124. GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 46(1). 
125. Id. at art. 46(2)(e)–(f). 
126. See Griffin Drake, Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding EU Data 
Privacy Compliance Amidst A Sea of Uncertainty, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 
163, 180–181, 193 (2017); Alec Stapp, GDPR After One Year: Costs and 
Consequences, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 24, 2019), 
https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/05/24/gdpr-after-one-year-costs-
and-unintended-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/SP44-WW67]. 
127. See generally Laurent Barthelemy, One Year On, EU’s GDPR Sets Global 
Standard for Data Protection, PHYS ORG (May 24, 2019), 
https://phys.org/news/2019-05-year-eu-gdpr-global-standard.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZZW-Z83D]. 
128. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151; Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-
US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1966 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling 
Personal Information in the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. 
L. REV. 877 (2014). 
129. Larry Downes, The Business Implications of the EU-U.S. “Privacy 
Shield”, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/02/the-
business-implications-of-the-eu-u-s-privacy-shield 
[https://perma.cc/X2JV-ABKT]. The Privacy Act of 1974 (as amended, 
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)), despite bearing this broad title, applies only to data 
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addition, policies around Internet freedom in the US have sought “to 
preserve and expand the Internet as an open, global space for free 
expression, for organizing and interaction, and for commerce.”130 This 
has been recently confirmed by the White House strategy on AI.131 
Under the First Amendment, the US has given free speech robust 
protection while data protection is regulated in a fragmented manner 
through federal privacy laws and a number of state laws.132 These laws 
either concern the public sector only or they are information-specific or 
medium-specific, for example through the regulation of health 
information, video privacy, or electronic communications.133 While the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) can adjudicate unfair or deceptive 
trade practices to discipline companies that fail to implement minimal 
data security measures or fail to meet its privacy policies, the US does 
not have an official data protection authority.134 As a consequence of 
 
processing conducted by the federal government, not by state 
governments or the private sector. The Privacy Act introduces a code of 
fair information practices that governs the collection, maintenance, use 
and dissemination of information about individuals that is maintained in 
systems of records by federal agencies. It obliges federal agencies to collect 
information to the greatest extent possible directly from the concerned 
individuals, to retain only relevant and necessary information, to maintain 
adequate and complete records, to provide individuals with a right of 
access to review and have their records corrected, and to establish 
safeguards to ensure the security of the information. See, e.g., Schwartz 
& Solove (2014), supra note 128.  
130. RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., THE NSA REPORT: LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 158 (2014). 
131. See THE WHITE HOUSE, GUIDANCE FOR REGULATION OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS (2019) (“[A]gencies should continue to 
promote advancements in technology and innovation, while protecting 
American technology, economic and national security, privacy, civil 
liberties, and other American values, including the principles of freedom, 
human rights, the rule of law, and respect for intellectual property.”). 
132. See, e.g., Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Speech, Privacy and Dignity in France 
and in the U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis, 38 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMPAR. L. REV. 101, 101–182 (2016) (describing the United States and 
its long-standing focus on freedom of expression in contrast to the 
evolution of privacy laws). 
133. See, e.g., id. 
134. See USA: Data Protection Laws and Regulations 2020, ICLG (June 7, 
2020), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-
regulations/usa [https://perma.cc/58VK-3FHL]; for a great overview of 
US privacy laws, see Sherri J. Deckelboim, Consumer Privacy on an 
International Scale: Conflicting Viewpoints Underlying The EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield Framework and How the Framework Will Impact Privacy 
Advocates, National Security, and Businesses, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263 
(2017); see also CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016) (following the evolution of the 
F.T.C. and the growth of its regulatory reach). 
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this fragmentation, there is no coherent definition of personal data or 
sensitive personal data. There are no restrictions on the transfer of 
personal data by private entities; instead, self-regulation and best 
practices are the common model of privacy protection.135 Additionally, 
data is seen as a transaction commodity and there are no limitations 
on data exports to other countries.136 Overall, there is a clear tendency 
towards liberal, market-based governance in contrast to the socially 
protective, rights-based governance in Europe.137 Even recent efforts at 
the state level to endorse stronger consumer privacy rights, such as the 
ones in California, show major differences compared to the EU’s 
fundamental rights’ model.138 The divergence in these overall 
approaches, as well as the protection on the ground granted in the US 
in specific sectors, could hardly be deemed adequate under the EU 
standards.139 
3. Bridging the EU–US differences: From Safe Harbor to the Privacy 
Shield and back to square one 
Reconciling the different privacy protection regimes between the 
two major players in data governance has had many implications, 
including an effect on trade law. Transatlantic data flows are of 
 
135. See generally Siona Listokin, Industry Self-Regulation of Consumer Data 
Privacy and Security, J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH & PRIVACY L. 15 
(2015) (discussing the advantages to self-regulation and analyzing 
empirical data from various websites with regards to privacy). 
136. See M. Anthony Mills, Is Data a Traded Commodity?, U.S. CHAMBER 
OF COM. FOUND. (May 21, 2014), 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/blog/post/data-traded-
commodity/34423 [https://perma.cc/6A65-R4DV]; DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF DATA: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS CONF. TRADE 
DEV. 13 (2016). 
137. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy 
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2000). 
138. Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, 
Catalyzing Privacy Law, GEO. L. FAC. PUB’N OTHER WORKS (2019); 
Fernanda G. Nicola & Oreste Pollicino, The Balkanization of Data 
Privacy Regulation, 123 W. VA. L. REV. 61 (2020); For a different opinion 
pointing towards convergence of the EU and US model of privacy 
protection, see Erdem Büyüksagis, Towards a Transatlantic Concept of 
Data Privacy, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 139 
(2019). 
139. See Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection, supra note 9, at 26; 
Schwartz, supra note 128, at 1980; Nicola & Pollicino, supra note 138; 
Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L. J. 
140 (2019). For a different perspective, see KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & 
DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2015) 
(taking the perspective on privacy law enhancement by encouraging 
leadership of corporations to make strides protecting individual privacy). 
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economic significance for both partners,140 so the stakes for finding a 
workable solution are high. This has led to an intense politization of 
the topic and to the creation of an ingenious set of legal mechanisms 
that permit transatlantic data transfers while providing certain 
safeguards.141 However, these hybrid mechanisms have been under 
substantial pressure, both politically and judicially, and thus have been 
adjusted over time. The first mechanism put in place under the 1995 
Directive was the so-called “Safe Harbor” scheme,142 which contained a 
series of principles concerning the protection of personal data that US 
undertakings subscribe to on a voluntary basis.143 However, the CJEU 
found in Schrems I that the Safe Harbor scheme did not provide an 
adequate level of protection of fundamental rights equivalent to that 
guaranteed within the EU.144 The Court observed that the Safe Harbor 
scheme is applicable solely to US undertakings that adhere to it, yet it 
does not bind US public authorities.145 It was also apparent that US 
national security, public interest, and law enforcement requirements 
prevailed over the Safe Harbor, meaning that US undertakings can 
disregard, without limitation, the rules laid down by that scheme where 
they conflict with such requirements146 — thus affecting fundamental 
rights of EU citizens. The Court found, furthermore, that US legislation 
is not limited to what is strictly necessary as it permits, on a generalized 
basis, storage of all the personal data of all the people whose data is 
transferred from the EU to the US without any differentiation, 
limitation, or exception without an objective criterion for determining 
the limits of the access of the public authorities to the data and of its 
subsequent use.147 Additionally, there were no legal remedies 
provided,148 so the Court ultimately declared the Safe Harbor decision 
invalid.149 
 
140. MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., U.S.-EU 
DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 4 (2016). 
141. See generally Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 
EUR. L. J., 140, 152 (2019). 
142. Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the safe harbor privacy principles and related 
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, 
2000 O.J. (L 215) 7. 
143. MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, supra note 140, at 5. 
144. Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 97 (Oct. 6, 2015).  
145. Id. ¶ 82.  
146. Id. ¶ 86.  
147. Id. ¶ 93.  
148. Id. ¶ 95. 
149. Id. ¶¶ 105–6. 
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After intense negotiations, the Safe Harbor was subsequently 
replaced by the so-called EU-US Privacy Shield (“Privacy Shield”).150 
The Privacy Shield was more stringent and detailed than the Safe 
Harbor agreement. While US companies (both data controllers and 
processors) still self-certify on an annual basis,151 the new arrangement 
provided stronger obligations for US companies to protect the personal 
data of European citizens according to a set of clearly defined 
principles.152 In addition, there were stronger monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms.153 Organizations could choose independent 
recourse mechanisms in either the EU or in the US, including the 
possibility to voluntarily cooperate with the EU data protection 
authorities (“DPAs”).154 Where organizations processed human 
resources data, the cooperation with the DPAs was mandatory.155 Other 
recourse options included independent Alternative Dispute Resolution 
or private-sector developed privacy programs that committed to the 
Privacy Principles.156 The purpose of the Privacy Shield framework was 
to provide data subjects with a number of possibilities to enforce their 
rights, lodge complaints regarding non-compliance by US companies, 
and to ultimately have their complaints resolved.157 This was not mere 
lip service; instead, US domestic law changed through the Judicial 
Redress Act of 2015,158 which extended certain rights of judicial redress 
established under the Privacy Act of 1974 to EU citizens.159 Next to 
the enhanced individual safeguard mechanisms, there was for the first 
time explicit assurance from the US that any access of public authorities 
to personal data will be subject to clear limitations, safeguards, and 
 
150. Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016, pursuant 
to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 
2016 O.J. (C 4176) [hereinafter Commission Implementing Decision]. For 
an overview, see European Commission MEMO/16/434, EU-US Privacy 
Shield: Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 29, 2016). 
151. Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 150, ¶ 14. 
152. Id. ¶¶ 19–29 (referring to the Notice Principle, Data Integrity and 
Purpose Limitation Principle, Choice Principle, Security Principle, Access 
Principle, Recourse, Enforcement and Liability Principle, and 
Accountability for Onward Transfer Principle). The principles are 
additionally detailed in Annex II attached to the Commission’s 
implementing decision, see generally id. 
153. Id. ¶ 8. 
154. Id. ¶ 40. 
155. Id.  
156. Id.  
157. Id. ¶¶ 43–63. 
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
159. Id.  
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oversight mechanisms.160 US authorities affirmed absence of 
indiscriminate or mass surveillance.161 Additionally, there was a new 
redress possibility through the EU-US Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, 
who had to be independent from the US Intelligence Community and 
could address individual complaints.162 In the European Commission’s 
assessment, all of these changes conformed with the standards set out 
in Schrems I, according to which legislation involving interference with 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the CFREU 
must impose “minimum safeguards,” cannot involve “on a generalised 
basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has 
been transferred from the European Union to the United States,” and 
must provide sufficient legal remedies.163  
Despite these additional safeguards and surviving three reviews of 
the European Commission,164 Schrems II165 still invalidated the EU-US 
Privacy Shield.166 Particularly, the Court found serious risks for the 
rights of EU citizens due to the still persistent primacy of US law 
enforcement requirements over those of the Privacy Shield;167 the lack 
of necessary limitations on the power of the US authorities, especially 
in light of proportionality requirements;168 and the lack of remedies for 
EU data subjects,169 including deficiencies in the ombudsman 
mechanism.170 The Schrems II holding had an immediate effect — US 
and EU authorities are back at the negotiation table and trying to find 
 
160. European Commission MEMO/16/2462, EU-US Privacy Shield: 
Frequently Asked Questions (July 12, 2016). 
161. Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 150, ¶¶ 64–90. 
162. Id. ¶¶ 119–122. For a great analysis of the EU-US Privacy Shield, see 
generally Deckelboim, supra note 134. 
163. Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 150, ¶¶ 90, 124 (citing 
Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015)). 
164. See, e.g., Report on the Third Annual Review of the Functioning of the 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, COM (2019) 495 final (Oct. 12, 2019). The 
reviews were however constantly accompanied by critique, voiced amongst 
others by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). See, e.g., EDPB, 
EU–U.S. Privacy Shield - Third Annual Joint Review (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpbprivacyshield3rd
annualreport.pdf_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ3P-F4FY]. 
165. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximillian 
Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020). 
166. Id. ¶ 65. 
167. Id. ¶ 164.  
168. Id. ¶¶ 168–185.  
169. Id. ¶¶ 191–192.  
170. Id. ¶¶ 193–197. 
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a swift solution, now dubbed “an enhanced EU-US Privacy Shield”171 
or “Privacy Shield 2.0.” Until such a solution materializes, which may 
demand various changes in US law,172 the standard contractual clauses 
(“SCCs”) remain the common way to allow transatlantic data 
transfers.173 While the SCCs survived Schrems II, their implementation 
has become somewhat more difficult. As the CJEU underlined,  
[s]ince by their inherently contractual nature standard data 
protection clauses cannot bind the public authorities of third 
countries’ but the GDPR interpreted in light of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights . . . require[s] that the level of protection of 
natural persons guaranteed by that regulation is not undermined, 
it may prove necessary to supplement the guarantees contained 
in those standard data protection clauses.174  
The assessment of whether the countries to which data are sent 
offer adequate protection is primarily the responsibility of the exporter 
and the importer when considering whether to enter into SCCs.175 
When performing this prior assessment, the exporter must take into 
consideration the content of the SCCs, the specific circumstances of the 
transfer, and the legal regime applicable in the importer’s country.176 If 
the result of this assessment is that the country of the importer does 
not provide an equivalent level of protection, the exporter may consider 
 
171. See Joint Press Statement from European Commissioner for Justice 
Didier Reynders and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/joint-press-statement-european-
commissioner-justice-didier-reynders-and-us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-
ross-7-august-2020-2020-aug-07_en [https://perma.cc/7BDD-SLSA]; see 
also CONG. RSCH. SERV., EU DATA TRANSFER REQUIREMENTS AND 
U.S. INTELLIGENCE LAWS: UNDERSTANDING SCHREMS II AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD (2021). 
172. Id. 
173. Jennifer Daskal, What Comes Next: The Aftermath of European Court’s 




174. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 132 (July 16, 2020).  
175. Statement on the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment in 
Case C-311/18 - Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and 




176. Id.  
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putting additional measures in place.177 When those contractual 
obligations are not or cannot be complied with, the exporter is bound 
by the SCCs to suspend the transfer, terminate the SCCs, or to notify 
its competent supervisory authority if it intends to continue 
transferring data.178 Overall, the post-Schrems II regime places an 
additional burden on companies, and the absence of a proper adequacy 
decision substantially reduces legal certainty — which in turn puts 
pressure on the political actors in finding a new reconciliation 
mechanism. This pressure comes from private actors too and has been 
exemplified by the actions of the activist group “none of your business,” 
led by Maximilian Schrems, which in the Schrems II aftermath filed 
over 100 complaints with regulators across all EU Member States 
against companies with European websites using code from Facebook 
or Google; in response the Irish Data Protection Commission sent 
Facebook a preliminary order to suspend data transfers to the US.179 
On the other side, Facebook has threatened withdrawal from the EU 
market and highlighted the grave implications for innovation and 
smaller businesses.180  
 
177. In this regard, it is expected that the EDPB as well as national data 
protection authorities will provide more concrete guidelines. Such 
guidelines have already been made available for instance by the Data 
Protection Authority of German Region of Baden-Württemberg 
(Landesbeauftragter für Datenschutz und Informationssicherheit, LfDI). 
The LfDI instructs in particular the following: (1) If a data exporter 
intends to continue to base data transfers from the EU/EEA to the USA 
on the SCCs, it must create additional guarantees that prevent access by 
US authorities (e.g. secret services), namely through encryption, 
anonymization or pseudonymization of the personal data in question, and 
only it may have the key for re-identification; (2) Transfers to other third 
countries are also only permitted after prior checking of the local legal 
situation (existing access options by the local authorities, additional 
measures); (3) If the measures mentioned cannot guarantee an adequate 
level of protection, a transfer according to 49 GDPR is only possible 
according to the wording in exceptional cases and only in individual cases, 
for example with the consent of the persons concerned, in the context of 
a contract or for the assertion of legal claims. Orientierungshilfe: Was 




178. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 133–39 (July 16, 2020); see also Statement on 
the Court of Justice, supra note 175. 
179. See, e.g., Sam Schechner & Emily Glazer, Ireland to Order Facebook to 
Stop Sending User Data to U.S., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2020). 
180. Schechner & Glazer, supra note 179; see also Alex Hern, Facebook Says 
It May Quit Europe over Ban on Sharing Data with US, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 22, 2020). 
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The next sections look at the body of international trade law and 
mechanisms that reconcile data flows and privacy protection, starting 
with the rules of the WTO and continuing with the newer arrangements 
found in free trade agreements (“FTAs”).  
C. Privacy under the WTO framework 
As noted above, privacy and data protection have not been a 
negotiation topic during the Uruguay round; the WTO law has not, as 
of the date of this writing, undergone any changes that reflect their 
growing importance or digital transformation in general.181 Despite this, 
and although WTO law represents a “hard” form of international law, 
it does include certain mechanisms meant to reconcile economic and 
non-economic interests, international commitments, and domestic 
values and sensitivities.182 Key amongst these mechanisms are the 
“general exceptions” formulated under Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (“GATT”)183 and Article XIV 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).184 These 
articles permit WTO Members to adopt measures, which would 
otherwise violate their obligations, under the condition that these 
measures are not disguised restrictions on trade.185 Particularly 
interesting for this article’s discussion is the possibility that Article XIV 
of the GATS may allow for both the existing data restrictions to remain 
and adoption of new data restrictions based on grounds of privacy 
protection. This article does not discuss the flexibilities available under 
the GATS, which permits WTO Members to tailor their commitments 
 
181. See generally Mira Burri, The International Economic Law Framework 
for Digital Trade, 135 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 10 
(2015); World Trade Report 2018: The Future of World Trade: How 
Digital Technologies are Transforming Global Commerce, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world_trade_repor
t18_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RMH-DRFD]. 
182. Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade 
Agreements: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 
87–88 (2017). 
183. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
184. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]. 
185. GATT 1994, supra note 183; GATS, supra note 184. 
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in the different service sectors, retain substantial policy space, and 
maintain and adopt certain restrictive measures.186 
While Article XIV of the GATS enumerates different grounds as 
possible justifications, such as the protection of human, animal, or plant 
life or health,187 especially pertinent for us are two categories: (1) those 
relating to public order or public morals188 and (2) those that are 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations.189 In the latter 
context, it is spelled out that this may be the case when it is necessary 
to secure compliance with laws or regulations relating to “the protection 
of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and 
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of 
individual records and accounts.”190 The focus here is on this provision 
and, for the sake of revealing how it is relevant for data flows, it is 
assumed that the rules of the EU GDPR are tested under it, because 
they were found to either violate the market access or the national 
treatment obligations of the EU under the GATS.191 
Article XIV of the GATS, similarly to Article XX of the GATT, 
involves a number of legal tests, as established by the WTO 
jurisprudence: (1) the panels and the Appellate Body consider whether 
 
186. The GATS, similarly to the GATT, is aimed at protecting equality of 
competitive opportunities for companies in domestic markets, regardless 
of their origin and the origin of their services, and at facilitating the 
progressive liberalization of these markets. The approach and structure of 
the GATS, however, differ from those of the GATT, and permit through 
the schedules of specific commitments “opting in” for market access and 
national treatment commitments. The commitments vary across sectors 
with very high level of liberalization for instance for telecommunication 
services and very low for other sectors, such as audiovisual services. See 
generally, e.g., Pierre Sauve & Anirudh Shingal, Reflections on the Nature 
of Preferences in Services, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 953 (2011). For the level 
of commitments in sectors relevant for digital trade, see Burri, supra note 
181. 
187. GATS, supra note 184, at art. XIV(b). 
188. GATS, supra note 184, at art. XIV(a); see generally Mark Wu, Free 
Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the Newly 
Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. OF INT. L. 215 
(2008); Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Puzzling Interaction of Trade and 
Public Morals in the Digital Era, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 276, 276–296 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012). 
189. GATS, supra note 184, at art. XIV(c). For a commentary of Article XIV 
GATS, see Thomas Cottier, Panagiotis Delimatsis & Nicolas Diebold, 
Article XIV GATS: General Exceptions, in 6 MAX PLANCK 
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW: TRADE IN SERVICES 287, 287–
328 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2008). 
190. GATS, supra note 184, at art. XIV(c)(ii). 
191. For a fully-fledged analysis of how this may occur, see Rolf H. Weber, 
Regulatory Autonomy and Privacy Standards Under the GATS, 7 ASIAN 
J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 25 (2012); KRISTINA IRION ET AL., 
TRADE AND PRIVACY: COMPLICATED BEDFELLOWS? 27–33 (2016). 
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the measure falls within the scope of one of the listed objectives in the 
exception;192 (2) the measure must address the relevant public interest 
at issue, with a sufficient nexus between the measure and the objective 
pursued;193 and (3) the measure is examined under the chapeau (the 
introductory paragraph) of Article XIV of the GATS.194 With regard 
to (1), there has been a wide margin of appreciation given to a WTO 
Member in the choice of objectives it seeks to protect.195 Further, (2) is 
much more complex and triggers the so-called “necessity” test. The 
Appellate Body noted that there are different degrees of necessity.196 
At one end of this continuum lies “necessary,” which is understood as 
“indispensable,” while at the opposite side, “necessary” is taken to mean 
“making a contribution to.”197 The Appellate Body noted that a 
“necessary” measure is located significantly closer to the pole of 
“indispensable” than to simply “making a contribution to.”198 The more 
important the interest that the measure is designed to protect and the 
greater the contribution to the objective, the easier it is to accept the 
measure as “necessary.”199 However, the Appellate Body has also stated 
that the requirement for measures “relating to” a goal (as is the case 
with the GATS privacy exception), is “more flexible textually” than a 
strict “necessity” requirement and may simply require a “substantial” 
or “reasonable” relationship of the measure to the objective pursued.200 
 
192. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 292, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter US—Gambling]. 
193. Id.; see also WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), ¶¶ 119–
124. 
194. US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶ 292. 
195. Id. ¶ 304. 
196. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 161, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea—Beef]. 
197. Id. 
198. Korea—Beef, supra note 196. 
199. US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶¶ 306–307; see also Panel Report, 
Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, ¶¶ 7.680, 
7.685, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Argentina—
Financial Services] (referring to Korea—Beef, supra note 196, ¶¶ 162–
163). 
200. Korea—Beef, supra note 196, n.104 (citing Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
¶ 19, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 9, 1996); see also Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 141, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
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Ultimately, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have clarified 
that this “weighing and balancing”201 of factors should also include a 
comparison of the challenged measure and its possible alternatives.202 
To show that the measure does not meet the necessity test, a claimant 
can demonstrate that a less trade-restrictive alternative to the measure 
has been “reasonably available.”203 The alternative measure cannot pose 
prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties to implement.204 A 
measure that has been provisionally justified under these material 
requirements of Article XIV(c)(ii) of the GATS must also meet the 
chapeau test, which states that a measure should not be applied in a 
manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like-conditions prevail, or is a 
disguised restriction on trade in services.205 The chapeau has been 
interpreted as preventing abuses or misuses of the right to invoke the 
exception206 and evaluating the “consistency of enforcement” of the 
challenged measure.207 
Admittedly, these tests set a high hurdle for WTO Members, and 
the “success rate” for passing through them has been rather low.208 
Scholars have argued that if the EU would be challenged before a WTO 
panel, its GDPR may also fail to satisfy this test on several particular 
grounds.209 Irion and others have argued that the EU may face a 
 
201. See US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶ 78; see also Appellate Body Report, 
China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 
T/DS363/AB/R, ¶ 239 (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China—Publications 
and Audiovisual Products].  
202. US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶ 306; Argentina—Financial Services, 
supra note 199, ¶ 7.684. 
203. Korea—Beef, supra note 196, ¶ 166. 
204. US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶ 308. This case was cited with approval 
in Argentina—Financial Services, supra note 199, ¶ 7.729. 
205. US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶ 339.  
206. Argentina—Financial Services, supra note 199, ¶ 7.743.  
207. In US—Gambling, the Appellate Body confirmed that the US ban on 
online gambling did not meet the requirement of the chapeau of Article 
XIV GATS due to ambiguity in relation to the scope of one US statute, 
which appeared to permit domestic suppliers to have remote betting 
services for horse racing. US—Gambling, supra note 192, ¶ 351. 
208. Only one case has so far passed all the tests. See Appellate Body Report, 
US—Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 186, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); see also Robert Howse, 
The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal 
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 
489, 492 (2002). 
209. Joshua D. Blume, Reading the Trade Tea Leaves: A Comparative 
Analysis of Potential United States WTO-GATS Claims Against Privacy, 
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problem with finding appropriate evidence on the performance of its 
data protection law.210 For instance, the EU-US Safe Harbor,211 as now 
invalidated,212 was not particularly stringent as shown by Schrems I. 
One can argue that this undermines the strength of a challenged 
measure’s contribution to securing compliance with the EU’s data 
protection law. Second, and this is a critical argument, it can well be 
maintained that there are less trade restrictive measures that are 
reasonably available for achieving the EU’s desired level of data 
protection. The GDPR is in many senses excessively burdensome with 
sizeable extraterritorial effects.213 Especially if compared with other 
data protection rules around the world, it may be difficult to prove that 
privacy cannot be otherwise protected.214 Even if the provisions on the 
transfer of personal data to third countries were to be deemed necessary 
to secure compliance with the GDPR, there is an argument to be made 
that these provisions have not been consistently implemented and 
would ultimately fail the chapeau test. If the EU has denied a third 
country’s application for adequacy assessment or a request to negotiate 
a sectoral scheme similar to that of the US-EU Safe Harbor or the 
Privacy Shield, it seems that the chapeau test requirements are hard to 
meet. The EU may effectively discriminate between different countries 
in finding adequate levels of protection or when engaging in cooperation 
with them, so that the standards of protection would be secured in 
terms of substance and procedure.215  
With regard to the application of Article XIV of the GATS to 
privacy protection matters, the scholarly debate is bound to continue 
as there is still no relevant case-law and as the importance of the topic 
increases. For now, it is critical to underline that the general exception 
clause under Article XIV of the GATS is a good example of both the 
flexibility of WTO law, as well as of its potential to intervene in 
domestic matters to discipline WTO Members and draw a line between 
 
Localization, and Cybersecurity Laws, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 801, 842 
(2018). 
210. IRION ET AL., supra note 191, at 36–39; see also Diana A. MacDonald & 
Christine M. Streatfeild, Personal Data Privacy and the WTO, 36 HOUS. 
J. INT’L L. 625, 640–650 (2014) (examining the Korean online data 
privacy protection in a hypothetical WTO dispute). 
211. See 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7. 
212. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 117/15, The Court 
of Justice Declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is 
Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015). 
213. Adele Azzi, The Challenges Faced by the Extraterritorial Scope of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & 
E-COM. L. 126, 127–128 (2018). 
214. LEE ANDREW BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 205 (2014); Yakoleva & Irion, supra note 46, at 202. 
215. IRION ET AL., supra note 191, at 36–39. 
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licit protection and illicit protectionism. Despite the current deadlock 
at the WTO and the crisis of its dispute resolution system,216 the 
interpretation of Articles XX of the GATT and XIV of the GATS 
remains of critical importance, as many free trade agreements stipulate 
their application mutatis mutandis, as discussed below.217 
D. Developments in free trade agreements 
As legal adaptations under the umbrella of the WTO have stalled, 
bilateral and regional FTAs have addressed many issues of digital trade 
and data governance. Indeed, from the 353 FTAs agreed upon between 
2000 and 2020, 188 FTAs have provisions of relevance for digital 
trade.218 The US has been a legal entrepreneur in this context and 
played a key role by endorsing liberal rules in the implementation of its 
“Digital Agenda.”219 The agreements reached since 2002 with Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Singapore, the Central 
American countries,220 Panama, Colombia, South Korea, and Japan, as 
well the updated North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
with Canada and Mexico, all contain critical WTO-plus (going above 
the WTO commitments) and WTO-extra (addressing issues not 
covered by the WTO) provisions in the broader field of digital trade.221 
However, the emergent regulatory template on digital issues is not 
limited to US agreements but instead has diffused and can be found in 
other FTAs as well; Singapore, Australia, Japan, and Colombia have 
 
216. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to 
Expect?, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 297 (2019). 
217. For instance, the 2020 Digital Economy Partnership Agreement between 
Chile, Singapore and New Zealand. See Overview, NEW ZEALAND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/digital-economy-
partnership-agreement/overview/ [https://perma.cc/VVC7-YTXG]. 
218. Mira Burri & Rodrigo Polanco, Digital Trade Provisions in Preferential 
Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 187, 
192 (2020). 
219. See generally Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Digital Trade Agenda of the 
US: Parallel Tracks of Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Liberalization, 
58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7 (2003). 
220. The DR-CAFTA includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. CAFTA-DR (Dominican 




221. Mira Burri, Understanding and Shaping Trade Rules for the Digital Era, 
in THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE 73, 94 
(Manfred Elsig et al. eds., 2019). 
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been amongst the major drivers of this diffusion.222 This section maps 
the emerging regulatory landscape in particular regarding data-relevant 
norms.223 
I. Overview of data-related rules in FTAs 
Trade rules matter for data and data flows for at least three reasons 
because: (i) they regulate the cross-border flow of data by regulating 
trade in goods and services as well as the protection of intellectual 
property; (ii) they may install certain beyond-the-border-rules that 
demand changes in domestic regulation — for example, on 
intermediaries’ liability; and (iii) trade law can limit the policy space 
that regulators have at home.224 In addition to this generic trade law 
framework, the last decade has also witnessed the emergence of entirely 
new rules that address the regulation of data flows.225 This section 
focuses on these rules in particular. In this context, it is first important 
to note that there is no common agreement on a definition for data 
flows in FTAs, despite the wide-spread rhetoric around the term and 
its frequent use in reports and studies.226 However, despite the different 
terms used in treaty language, there seems to be a clear tendency for a 
broad and encompassing definition of data flows, (1) where there are 
bits of information (data) as part of the provision of a service or a 
product and (2) where this data crosses borders, although the data 
flows do not neatly coincide with one commercial transaction and the 
provision of a certain service may relate to multiple flows of data.227 
Additionally, there has thus far not been a distinction between different 
types of data so far — for instance, between personal and non-personal 
 
222. Id. 
223. This analysis is based on a dataset of all data-relevant norms in trade 
agreements (TAPED). See Burri & Polanco, supra note 218, at 192; 
TAPED: A New Dataset on Data-related Trade Provisions, UNIVERSITY 
OF LUCERNE, http://unilu.ch/taped [https://perma.cc/REG3-Q7KC]. 
224. Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements: 
The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, supra note 182; see also Francesca 
Casalini & Javier López González, Trade and Cross-Border Data Flows, 
11 (OECD Trade Pol’y Papers No. 220, 2019). 
225. Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements: 
The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, supra note 182, at 68.  
226. See, e.g., Casalini & González, supra note 224, at 12 (describing the lack 
of consensus on a definition for personal data). 
227. As the OECD further clarifies: “the actual flow of data reflects individual 
firm choices: accessing the OECD library from Paris, for instance, actually 
means contacting a server in the United States (the OECD uses a US-
based company for its web services). Moreover, with the cloud, data can 
live in many places at once, with files and copies residing in servers around 
the world.” Trade and Cross-Border Trade Flows, OECD (Oct. 2019), 
https://issuu.com/oecd.publishing/docs/trade_and_cross-
border_data_flows [https://perma.cc/STF9-ZV8A]. 
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data, personal or company data, or machine-to-machine data.228 Yet, 
personal information is commonly included explicitly in the data-
related provisions in FTAs,229 where the potential clashes with domestic 
data protection regimes become evident. 
Overall, specific data-related provisions are a relatively new 
phenomenon and are found primarily in dedicated e-commerce chapters 
of FTAs — but only in a handful of agreements.230 These types of 
provisions generally refer to the cross-border flow of data and rules 
banning or limiting data localization requirements.231 Provisions on 
data flows can also be found in chapters dealing with discrete service 
sectors where data is inherent to the very definition of those services — 
such as the telecommunications and financial services sectors.232 
II. Rules on data flows and data localization in recent FTAs 
Non-binding provisions on data flows appeared in early agreements, 
such as the 2000 Jordan-US FTA.233 Yet, it is only in recent years that 
 
228. For instance, Sen classifies data into personal data referring to data 
related to individuals; company data referring to data flowing between 
corporations; business data referring to digitized content such as software 
and audiovisual content; and social data referring to behavioral patterns 
determined using personal data. Nivedita Sen, Understanding the Role of 
the WTO in International Data Flows: Taking the Liberalization or the 
Regulatory Autonomy Path?, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 323, 343–346 (2018). 
Aaronson and Leblond categorize data into personal data, public data, 
confidential business data, machine-to-machine data and metadata, 
although they do not specifically define each of these terms. Susan Ariel 
Aaronson & Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data 
Realms and its Implications for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 250 
fig.1 (2018). The OECD has also tried to break data into different 
categories. See Data in the Digital Age, Policy Brief, OECD (Mar. 2019) 
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/data-in-the-digital-age.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72JZ-EVWQ]. 
229. Mira Burri, Data Flows and Global Trade Law, in BIG DATA & GLOBAL 
TRADE LAW 11–41 (Mira Burri ed., 2021). 
230. Id. Only some 30 FTAs have provisions on data flows and many of them 
are of soft law nature, id. 
231. Id. 
232. This article does not cover specific services sectors. For a more detailed 
analysis, see, e.g., Mira Burri, Telecommunications and Media Services, 
in Preferential Trade Agreements: Path Dependences Still Matter, in 
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: 
COHERENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN SERVICES TRADE LAW 169–192 (Rhea 
Tamara Hoffmann & Markus Krajewski eds., 2020). 
233. A similar wording is used in the 2008 Canada-Peru FTA, 2010 Hong-
Kong-New Zealand FTA, 2011 Korea-Peru FTA, 2011 Central America-
Mexico FTA, 2013 Colombia-Costa Rica FTA, 2013 Canada-Honduras 
FTA, 2014 Canada-Korea FTA, and 2015 Japan-Mongolia FTA. The 
2007 South Korea-US FTA was the first agreement with more concrete 
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these rules have been made binding and more comprehensive.234 
Particularly important in this context were the negotiations of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPP”)235 between the US and 
eleven countries in the Pacific Rim.236 The TPP sought to be a bold 
21st century trade deal and thus aimed to move away from the brick-
and-mortar WTO Agreements and reflect the new digital reality.237 
While the TPP did not eventually materialize because the Trump 
administration withdrew from it,238 it gave the basis for two important 
treaties — (1) the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Transpacific Partnership (“CPTPP”)239 between the remainder of the 
TPP parties; and (2) the renegotiated NAFTA, which is now referred 
to as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”).240 The 
CPTPP’s and the USMCA’s electronic commerce chapters build upon 
the TPP and reflect the US agenda on the relevant issues evidenced by 
the creation of a comprehensive template for digital trade with strong 
rules on data flows.241 We look in turn at these treaties.242 
 
language on data flows, albeit in a soft law form (Korea-US FTA, Article 
15.8). See Burri, Data Flows and Global Trade Law, supra note 229. 
234. Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade Agreements, 
48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 407, 425 (2017). 
235. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/9LYF-5EJA] [hereinafter 
TPP]. 
236. See id. at annex 2-D.  
237. See generally John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: A ‘21st Century’ Trade Agreement?, 22 NEW POL. ECON. 
573 (2017). 
238. Letter from Maria L. Pagan, Acting United States Trade Rep., to Trans-
Pacific Partnership Depositary (Jan. 30, 2017). 
239. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific 
Partnership, AUSTL. GOVERNMENT DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE [hereinafter CPTPP], 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/official-
documents/Pages/official-documents [https://perma.cc/72HF-VLH4]. 
240. See Wolfgang Alschner & Rama Panford-Walsh, How Much of the 
Transpacific Partnership is in the United-States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement? 2 (Ottawa Faculty of L., Working Paper No. 2019-28, 2019). 
241. See generally Mira Burri, Adapting Trade Rules for the Age of Big Data, 
in TRADE IN KNOWLEDGE: ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS 
(Antony Taubman & Kayashree Watal eds., forthcoming 2021). 
242. For a fully-fledged analysis, see Burri, The Governance of Data and Data 
Flows in Trade Agreements, supra note 182. See also Burri, Data Flows 
and Global Trade Law, supra note 229. 
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The CPTPP sought, for the first time, to explicitly restrict the use 
of data localization measures.243 Article 14.13(2) prohibits the parties 
from requiring a “covered person to use or locate computing facilities 
in that Party’s territory as a condition for conducting business in that 
territory.”244 The soft language from the US-South Korea FTA on free 
data flows is now also framed as a hard rule: “[e]ach Party shall allow 
the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, including 
personal information, when this activity is for the conduct of the 
business of a covered person.”245 The rule has a broad scope and most 
of the data that is transferred over the internet is likely to be covered, 
although the word “for” may suggest the need for some causality 
between the flow of data and the business of the covered person. 
Measures restricting digital flows or localization requirements under 
Article 14.13 of the CPTPP are permitted only if they do not amount 
to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on trade” and do not “impose restrictions on transfers of information 
greater than are required to achieve the objective.”246 These non-
discriminatory conditions are similar to the test formulated by Article 
XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT, which, as noted earlier, 
is meant to balance trade and non-trade interests.247 The CPTPP test 
differs from the WTO norms in one significant element: while there is 
a list of public policy objectives in the GATT and the GATS (such as 
public morals or public order), the CPTPP provides no such 
enumeration and simply speaks of a “legitimate public policy 
objective.”248 This language permits more regulatory autonomy for the 
CPTPP signatories. However, it also may lead to abuses and overall 
legal uncertainty. Further, it should be noted that the ban on 
localization measures is somewhat softened regarding financial services 
and institutions.249 An annex to the Financial Services chapter has a 
separate data transfer requirement, whereby certain restrictions on data 
flows may apply for the protection of privacy or confidentiality of 
 
243. Burri, Data Flows and Global Trade Law, supra note 229. 
244. CPTPP, supra note 239, at art. 14.13(2). 
245. Id. at art. 14.11(2) (emphasis added). 
246. Id. at art. 14.11(3). 
247. See GATS, supra note 184, at art. XIV; GATT, supra note 183, at art. 
XX.  
248. See CPTPP, supra note 239, at art. 14.11(3). 
249. See id. at art. 14.1 (defining “a covered person” in Article 14.1, which is 
said to exclude a “financial institution” and a “cross-border financial 
service supplier”).  
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individual records, or for prudential reasons.250 Government 
procurement is also excluded.251 
After the withdrawal of the US from the TPP,252 there was some 
uncertainty as to the direction the US would follow in its trade deals, 
specifically on matters of digital trade.253 The USMCA casts these 
doubts aside. The USMCA has a comprehensive electronic commerce 
chapter, which is now also properly titled “Digital Trade” and follows 
all critical lines of the CPTPP in ensuring the free flow of data through 
a clear ban on data localization,254 providing a non-discrimination 
regime for digital products,255 and a hard rule on free information 
flows.256 The USMCA permits the pursuit of certain non-economic 
objectives.257 Article 19.11 specifies, similar to the CPTPP, that parties 
can adopt or maintain a measure inconsistent with the free flow of data 
provision, if this is necessary to achieve a legitimate public policy 
objective, provided that the measure: (1) is not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade; and (2) does not 
impose restrictions on transfers of information greater than are 
necessary to achieve the objective.258 The USMCA clarified further that 
“a measure does not meet the conditions of this paragraph if it accords 
different treatment to data transfers solely on the basis that they are 
cross-border in a manner that modifies the conditions of competition to 
 
250. CPTPP, supra note 239, at art. 11 § B (“Each Party shall allow a 
financial institution of another Party to transfer information in electronic 
or other form, into and out of its territory, for data processing if such 
processing is required in the institution’s ordinary course of business.”). 
251. Id. at art. 14.8(3). 
252. Letter from Maria L. Pagan, supra note 238.  
253. See generally RACHEL F. FEFER ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R44565, DIGITAL TRADE AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (May 21, 2019); see 




254. Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican 




255. Id. at art. 19.4.  
256. Id. at art. 19.11. 
257. See id.; see generally M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44981, THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO-
CANADA AGREEMENT (USMCA) (July 27, 2020). 
258. USMCA, supra note 254, at art. 19.11(2).  
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the detriment of service suppliers of another Party,”259 which effectively 
connects to the necessity test under WTO law.  
Subsequent treaties, such as the 2016 Chile-Uruguay FTA; the 2016 
Updated Singapore-Australia FTA; the 2019 US-Japan Digital Trade 
Agreement (“DTA”), which also covers financial and insurance services; 
and the 2020 Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (“DEPA”) 
between Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore closely follow the CPTPP 
template and enhance the diffusion of the rules on data flows and data 
localization.260 
In contrast, the EU has been cautious when inserting rules on data 
in its free trade deals. However, recently the EU made a step towards 
such binding rules, where parties have agreed to consider commitments 
related to cross-border flow of information in future negotiations.261 
This type of clause is found in the 2018 EU-Japan EPA262 and in the 
modernization of the trade section of the EU-Mexico Global 
Agreement.263 In the latter two agreements, the parties commit to 
“reassess” the need for inclusion of provisions on the free flow of data 
into the treaty within three years of the entry into force of the 
agreement.264 This signals a repositioning of the EU on the issue of data 
flows, as well as the EU’s wish to link this commitment in due time 
with the high data protection standards of the GDPR,265 as discussed 
in more detail below.  
 
259. Id. at 19.11(2) n.5.  
260. Cf. U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement (“DTA”), Japan-U.S., Oct. 7, 
2019, [hereinafter DTA] 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/Agreement_
between_the_United_States_and_Japan_concerning_Digital_Trade.p
df [https://perma.cc/B7UQ-RWKL], with CPTPP, supra note 239. 
261. See, e.g., id. at art. 15.3(3); see also Questions & Answers: EU-UK 




262. Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic 
Partnership, E.U.-Japan, Feb. 1, 2019, at art. 8.81 [hereinafter EPA] 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157228.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JH8X-BQS4].  
263. See generally Modernisation of the Trade part of the EU-Mexico Global 
Agreement 
Without Prejudice, EUR. COMM’N (Apr. 21, 2018), 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/april/tradoc_156798.pdf [p
erma.cc/R9J2-A29X]. 
264. Id. at art. XX. 
265. See generally Horizontal Provisions for Cross-Border Data Flows and 
for Personal Data Protection in EU Trade and Investment Agreements, 
EUR. COMM’N [hereinafter Horizontal Provisions] 
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III. Rules on data protection 
Thus far, 91 FTAs include provisions on data protection.266 Yet, 
the nature of the awarded protection varies considerably and can 
include both binding and non-binding provisions.267 This is 
symptomatic of the different positions of the major actors and the 
inherent tensions between the regulatory goals of data innovation and 
data protection. Earlier agreements, such as the 2000 Jordan-US FTA 
Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, address privacy issues in 
hortatory provisions.268 Later agreements remain still in the domain of 
soft law, but include a variety of cooperation activities to improve the 
level of protection of privacy and curb obstacles to trade that requires 
transfers of personal data.269 These activities include sharing 
information and experiences on regulations, laws and programs on data 




266. See generally Regional Trade Agreement Database, 
WTO, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx [perma.cc/MPP7
-HDY4]; see also TAPED, supra note 3. 
267. Cf. EPA, supra note 262, at art. 8.81, with USMCA, supra note 254, at 
art. 19 
268. Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, Jordan-U.S., June 7, 2000, 
art. II, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/us-jrd/St.Ecomm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WAQ2-252S]; see United States (U.S.)-Jordan: 
Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area art. 
7(3), October 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63. 
269. See DTA, supra note 260; see, e.g., Stephen Ezell & Nigel Cory, The 
Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-
property-internationally [perma.cc/LW76-SQ7L]. 
270. See, e.g., Brazil-Chile Free Trade Agreement, GOVERNO DO BRAZ. 




B8DB]; Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and The Republic of 
Korea, GOV’T CAN. art. 13.7(b), https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/korea-
coree/index.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/9M85-4923]; Agreement 
Between Australia and Japan for an Economic Partnership, AUSTL. 
GOV’T DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. art. 13.10.2, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/jaepa/Pages/japan-
australia-economic-partnership-agreement [https://perma.cc/8GL4-
D6DY]; Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Chile-Colombia el cual constituye 
un protocolo adicional al ACE 24, GOBIERNO DE COLOMBIA 
MINISTERIO DE COMERCIO, INDUSTRIA Y TURISMO art. 12.5(b), 
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Nicaragua-Republic of China (Taiwan) Free Trade Agreement, 
MINISTRY OF ECON. AFF. R.O.C. art. 14.05(b), 
https://www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/english/news/News.aspx?kind=6&men
u_id=176&news_id=92502 [https://perma.cc/3XSZ-45YA]; Free Trade 
Agreement Between the Republic of Singapore and the Republic of 
Panama, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. art. 13.4(b), 
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/panama-trade-agreements 
[https://perma.cc/L2CG-25YN]; CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-
Central America FTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE REP. art. 14.5(b), 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-
dominican-republic-central-america-fta [perma.cc/WBR9-LQZS]; United 
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP. art. 
15.5(b), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta [perma.cc/77BW-SGQX]. 
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personal information;271 technical assistance in the form of exchanging 
information and experts,272 research, and training activities;273 or the 
establishment of joint programs and projects.274 
FTAs have also dealt with personal data protection with reference 
to the adoption of domestic standards. While some merely recognize 
the importance or the benefits of protecting personal information 
 
271. See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. art. 
13.3.1(b)(i), https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-
partnership-agreement [https://perma.cc/E84R-A3D9]; USMCA, 
supra note 254, at art. 19.14.1(a)(i); Peru-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. art. 13.14(b)(i), 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/pafta/Pages/peru-
australia-fta [https://perma.cc/N8SG-P87D]; Sri Lanka – 






%20exporting%20party [https://perma.cc/6545-E3MU]; Turkey – 
Singapore Free Trade Agreement (TRSFTA), ENTERPRISE SINGAPORE 
art. 9.9(c), https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-
singapore-companies/free-trade-agreements/ftas/singapore-ftas/trsfta 
[https://perma.cc/E2ZK-H7V5]; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of 
the Republic of Korea, MINISTRY COM. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA art. 
13.5, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enkorea.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/MNZ7-PVSH]; Colombia-Costa Rica Free Trade 
Agreement, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB art. 
16.6.2, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaties/treaties-with-investment-provisions/3397/colombia-
--costa-rica-fta-2013- [https://perma.cc/EJY7-5QCJ]; Canada-Colombia 





272. Agreement Establishing Association Between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, 
COUNCIL EUR. UNION art. 30, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-
agreements/agreement/?id=2002086 [https://perma.cc/P7HH-ZR3W].  
273. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the Republic of 
Korea, KCS TOTAL SOLUTION art. 10.8.1(b), 
https://www.customs.go.kr/engportal/cm/cntnts/cntntsView.do?mi=73
09&cntntsId=2332 [https://perma.cc/PZ6M-R5UF].  
274. Agreement Establishing Association Between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, supra 
note 272.  
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online,275 in several treaties parties specifically commit to adopt or 
maintain legislation or regulations that protects the personal data or 
privacy of its users.276 Representative of this group are the CPTPP and 
the USMCA.277 Yet, while Article 14.8(2) of the CPTPP requires every 
party to “adopt or maintain a legal framework that provides for the 
protection of the personal information of the users of electronic 
commerce,”278 no standards or benchmarks for the legal framework have 
been specified, except for a general requirement that the parties “take 
into account principles or guidelines of relevant international bodies.”279 
A footnote provides some clarification in saying that: “[f]or greater 
certainty, a Party may comply with the obligation in this paragraph 
by adopting or maintaining measures such as a comprehensive privacy, 
personal information or personal data protection laws, sector-specific 
laws covering privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement of 
voluntary undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy.”280 Parties 
are also invited to promote compatibility between their data protection 
regimes by essentially treating lower standards as equivalent.281 Overall, 
the goal seems to be to prioritize trade over privacy rights.  
The USMCA is interesting in two aspects when compared to the 
CPTPP and the US’s position on data protection issues. While Article 
19.8 of the USMCA remains soft on prescribing domestic regimes on 
personal data protection, it recognizes principles and guidelines of 
relevant international bodies.282 Article 19.8 states in particular that 
“in the development of its legal framework for the protection of 
personal information, each Party should take into account principles 
and guidelines of relevant international bodies, such as the APEC 
Privacy Framework and the OECD Recommendation of the Council 
concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and 
 
275. See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement, supra note 271; Brazil-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra 
note 270; EPA, supra note 262; Central America – Korea Free Trade 
Agreement, KCS TOTAL SOLUTION art. 14.5.1, 
http://www.customs.go.kr/download/ftaportalkor/_down/trty/han_ma
_02_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XTH-RGDL]; Canada – Honduras Free 
Trade Agreement, GOV’T CAN. art. 16.2.2(e), 
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/honduras/fta-ale/background-
contexte.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/U6E7-N5GB].  
276. See CPTPP, supra note 239, annex § 7(e). 
277. Id.; USMCA, supra note 254, at art. 19.8. 
278. CPTPP, supra note 239, at art. 14.8(2).  
279. Id. 
280. Id. at art. 14.8(2) n.6. 
281. See id. at art. 14.8(5). 
282. See USMCA, supra note 254, at art. 19.8. 
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Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013).”283 The USMCA parties 
also recognize key principles of data protection. These include: 
limitation on collection; choice; data quality; purpose specification; use 
limitation; security safeguards; transparency; individual participation; 
and accountability,284 and aim to provide remedies for any violations.285 
This is interesting because it may go beyond what the US has in its 
national laws on data protection and also because it reflects some of 
the principles the EU has advocated in the domain of the protection of 
privacy. One may speculate, as discussed in more detail below, whether 
this is a development caused by the so-called “Brussels effect,” where 
the EU “exports” its own domestic standards by virtue of its large 
domestic market and regulatory capabilities and they become global,286 
or whether we are seeing a shift in US privacy protection regimes as 
well.287 
As mentioned earlier, the EU has sought more binding 
commitments for privacy protection in its FTAs. For instance, many of 
the EU’s agreements have special chapters on protection of personal 
data, including the principles of purpose limitation, data quality and 
proportionality, transparency, security, right to access, rectification and 
opposition, restrictions on onward transfers, and protection of sensitive 
data, as well as provisions on enforcement mechanisms, coherence with 
international commitments and cooperation between the parties in 
order to ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data.288 The 
 
283. Id. at art. 19.8(2). 
284. Id. at art. 19.8(3). 
285. Id. at art. 19.8(4)–(5). 
286. See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(2012); ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN 
UNION RULES THE WORLD (2020). 
287. For a great analysis, see Chander, Kaminski & McGeveran, supra note 
138. 
288. 2009 O.J. (L 57) 61–65; Economic Partnership Agreement between the 






%20regional%20value%20chains [https://perma.cc/FY9R-89E5]. Other 
agreements merely recognize principles for the collection, processing and 
storage of personal data such as: prior consent, legitimacy, purpose, 
proportionality, quality, safety, responsibility and information, but 
without developing this in detail. Argentina - Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB art. 11.2.5(f) n.1, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaties/treaties-with-investment-provisions/3796/argentina-
--chile-fta-2017- [https://perma.cc/ZZC8-E7AS]; Chile – Uruguay 
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EU has also pushed for more safeguards, requiring its partners to adopt 
appropriate measures to ensure the privacy protection while allowing 
the free movement of data, establishing a criterion of “equivalence.”289 
Parties also commit to inform each other of their applicable rules and 
negotiate reciprocal, general or specific agreements,290 as exemplified by 
the additional adequacy decisions of the European Commission, most 
recently with Japan.291 As noted above, the EU wishes to permit data 
flows only if coupled with the high data protection standards of the 
GDPR.292 In its currently negotiated trade deals with Australia,293 New 
Zealand,294 and Tunisia,295 as well as in the EU proposal for WTO rules 
 
Economic Complementation Agreement No. 75, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y 




289. See Q&A, supra note 261; see also U.N. Division on Technology and 
Logistics, Data Protection Regulations and International Data Flows: 
Implications for Trade and Development, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DTL/STICT/2016/1/iPub (2016). 
290. Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Singapore, art. 
8.54, ¶ 2, Nov. 14, 2011, O.J. (L 294); Protocol on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance on Custom Matters, art. 10, Oct. 21, 2016, O.J. (L 287); 
Protocol 5 on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Custom Matters, art. 
10.2, Bosn. & Herz., Mar. 20, 2004, O.J. (L 84); Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement Establishing the European Community and its Member States, 
of the One Part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the 
other Part, art. 45, Oct. 10, 2005, O.J. (L 265); Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement Establishing the European Community and its Member States, 
of the One Part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the 
other Part, Protocol No. 7, Oct. 10, 2005, O.J. (L 265). 
291. See 2019 O.J. (L 76).  
292. See Horizontal Provisions, supra note 265, at art. A(1).  
293. See European Union’s Proposal for the EU-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, EU-Austl., Oct. 10, 2018, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157570.p
df [https://perma.cc/GC44-HT6D].  
294. See European Union’s Proposal for the EU-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement, EU-N.Z., Sept. 25, 2018, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157581.p
df [https://perma.cc/9AZ7-2V5G]. 
295. See La Proposition de l’Union Européenne pour l’Accord de Libre-échange 
EU-Tunisie [The European Union’s Proposal for the EU-Tunisia Free 
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on electronic commerce,296 the EU follows a distinct model of endorsing 
and protecting privacy as a fundamental right.297 On one hand, the EU 
and its partners seek to ban data localization measures and subscribe 
to a free data flow, but on the other hand, these commitments are 
conditioned. These conditions include first a dedicated article on data 
protection, which clearly states that “[e]ach Party recognizes that the 
protection of personal data and privacy is a fundamental right and that 
high standards in this regard contribute to trust in the digital economy 
and to the development of trade,”298 followed by a paragraph on data 
sovereignty, which states that, “[e]ach Party may adopt and maintain 
the safeguards it deems appropriate to ensure the protection of personal 
data and privacy, including through the adoption and application of 
rules for the cross-border transfer of personal data. Nothing in this 
agreement shall affect the protection of personal data and privacy 
afforded by the Parties’ respective safeguards.”299 The EU also wishes 
to retain the right to see how the implementation of the FTA impacts 
the conditions of privacy protection specifically with regards to data 
flows.300 In this sense, there is a review possibility within three years of 
the entry into force of the agreement and parties remain free to propose 
a review of the list of restrictions at any time.301 In addition, there is a 
broad carve-out in the treaty stating that, “[t]he Parties reaffirm the 
right to regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy 
objectives, such as the protection of public health, social services, public 
education, safety, the environment including climate change, public 
morals, social or consumer protection, privacy and data protection, or 
the promotion and protection of cultural diversity.”302 The EU thus 
reserves ample regulatory leeway for its current and future data 
protection measures. The exception is also fundamentally different than 
the objective necessity test under the CPTPP and the USMCA, or that 
under WTO law, because it is subjective in nature and safeguards the 
 
296. Communication from the European Union, Joint Statement on Electronic 
Commerce, EU Proposal for WTO Disciplines and Commitments 
Relating to Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/22 (Apr. 26, 
2019). 
297. 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10, at art. 7.  
298. See, e.g., EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 293 at art. 
6(1); European Union’s Proposal for the EU-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 294; The European Union’s Proposal for the EU-
Tunisia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 295. 
299. See, e.g., EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 293, at art. 
6(2). 
300. Id. at art. 5(2). 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at art. 2.  
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EU’s right to regulate.303 While the new EU approach has been 
confirmed by the recently adopted post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (“TCA”) with the United Kingdom,304 the EU appears likely 
to tailor its template depending on the trade partner — for example, 
the negotiated agreement with Chile has, at least so far, no provisions 
on data flows and data protection,305 while the negotiated deal with 
Indonesia includes merely a place-holder for rules on data flows.306 The 
recently signed agreement with Vietnam, which entered into force on 
August 1, 2020, has only a few cooperation provisions on electronic 
commerce as part of the services chapter and does not refer to either 
data or privacy protection.307 One should also be reminded that many 
agreements following the EU model, such as the draft e-commerce 
chapter of the countries of the European Free Trade Area (“EFTA”),308 
as well as the DEPA309 include a general exception clause that follows 
the lines of Article XIV of the GATS to be applied mutatis mutandis, 
and permits exceptions across all sectors and on top of the mentioned 
carve-outs.310 
An interesting and much anticipated development against the 
backdrop of the diverging EU and US positions has been the recent 
 
303. Svetlana Yakovleva, Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade 
Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy, 74 UNIV. MIA. L. REV. 416, 496 
(2020). 
304. 2020 O.J. (L 444) 14. 




306. European Union’s Proposal for the EU-Indonesia FTA, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1620 
[https://perma.cc/PN6F-5692]. 
307. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam, E.U.-Viet., Dec. 6, 2020, O.J. (L 186). 
308. The EFTA countries are Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. 
They have so far not included any e-commerce provisions in their FTAs, 
as a group or separately, except for the Japan-Switzerland FTA of 2009, 
which has some, mostly non-binding provisions on digital trade. The 
author has consulted the EFTA Advisory Committees on the draft EFTA 
e-commerce chapter and has the text on file. See About EFTA, 
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASS’N, https://www.efta.int/about-efta 
[https://perma.cc/M5WS-ZY7G]. 
309. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), MINISTRY OF 




310. It is often the case that there are sectorial carve-outs too that this article 
does not elaborate upon – for instance, in the areas of audiovisual and 
financial services, as well as government procurement. 
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Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) between the 
ASEAN Members,311 China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand. In terms of norms for the data-driven economy, the RCEP is 
certainly a less ambitious effort than the CPTPP and the USMCA, but 
still brings about significant changes to the regulatory environment 
and, in particular, to China’s commitments in the area of digital trade. 
The RCEP provides only for conditional data flows while preserving a 
lot of policy space for domestic policies, which very well may be of a 
data-protectionist nature. So, while the RCEP e-commerce includes a 
ban on localization measures,312 as well as a commitment to free data 
flows,313 there are clarifications that give RCEP members significant 
policy space and essentially undermine the impact of the existing 
commitments. In this line, there is an exception possible for legitimate 
public policies and a footnote to Article 12.14.3(a), which says that, 
“[f]or the purposes of this subparagraph, the Parties affirm that the 
necessity behind the implementation of such legitimate public policy 
shall be decided by the implementing Party.” This essentially goes 
against any exceptions assessment as we know it under WTO law and 
triggers a self-judging mechanism. In addition, subparagraph (b) of 
12.14.3 says that the article does not prevent a party from taking “any 
measure that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests.”314 Such measures shall not be disputed by other 
Parties.315 Article 12.15 on cross-border transfer of information follows 
the same language and thus secures plenty of policy space, for countries 
like China or Vietnam, to control data flows without further 
justification.316 
 
311. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. What is ASEAN?, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-
asean#:~:text=The%20Association%20of%20Southeast%20Asian%20Nat
ions%20(ASEAN)%20is%20a%20regional,Singapore%2C%20Thailand%2
C%20and%20Vietnam [https://perma.cc/KT2U-5LNJ].  
312. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, art. 12.14 (2020), 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/rcep/rcep-
text-and-associated-documents [https://perma.cc/V87Q-LWMA]. 
313. Id. at art. 12.15. 
314. Id. at art. 12.14.3(b) (emphasis added). The “essential security interest” 
language has been endorsed by China also in the framework of the WTO 
e-commerce negotiations. See WTO Electronic Commerce Negotiations, 
Consolidated Negotiating Text, WTO Doc. INF/ECOM/62/Rev. 1 (Dec. 
14, 2020). 
315. Id. at art. 12.14.3(b) 
316. Id. at art. 12.15.3 (a) & (b). 
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E. Pros and cons of the existing reconciliation 
models 
The above sections revealed not only the intensified contestation 
between free data flows as an essential element of the data-driven 
economy and the protection of privacy as a sovereign right of states to 
safeguard their citizens, but also the different regulatory approaches 
states have sought to reconcile these interests. In the face of failing 
international cooperation and the diverging positions of the major 
stakeholders of the EU and the US, trade venues, and perhaps oddly 
— or even wrongly so —317 have become platforms for rule-creation 
that try to interface data flows and privacy protection. However, we 
are far from an optimal model. States are still grappling to find viable 
mechanisms, which not only provide a level of certainty and market 
access for businesses but also reflect the state’s societal values.  
Each of the existing models comes with certain pros and cons. The 
international framework is not fully developed with regard to privacy 
protection; it is not binding, nor does it have mechanisms that can 
effectively reconcile the clash of rights.318 The transnational regimes 
under the OECD and the APEC, though still not binding and of club-
nature, have provided agreement on some basic regulatory principles 
that shape domestic frameworks, while at the same time ensure the free 
flow of information.319 As the underlying principles of these frameworks 
become increasingly integrated into trade law, which enhances their 
regulatory strength and diffusion across countries, they may provide a 
good way to tackle the tensions. However, oversight and enforceability 
in the case of violations remain important questions without an 
adequate answer. For countries, like the EU Member States, that 
demand appropriate checks and balances for the protection of 
individual rights, they may, plainly, not be enough. In the area of 
international trade law, we have the generic exception clauses under 
Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of the GATS.320 Similar 
clauses have also been replicated in a number of FTAs mutatis 
mutandis.321 They provide for a stringent test that seeks to constrain 
protectionism when states pursue non-economic objectives; but since 
 
317. See Yakovleva, supra note 303, at 497. 
318. See generally Yakovleva & Irion, supra note 46. 
319. See About APEC, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, 
https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC 
[https://perma.cc/MT9W-NYKL]; About, ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
https://www.oecd.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/CGB9-ACZP]. 
320. GATT 1994, supra note 183, art. XX; GATS, supra note 184, art. XIV. 
321. See e.g., DEPA, supra note 309.  
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we have no jurisprudence,322 we are yet unsure how they will be applied 
in practice, and whether for instance the EU’s GDPR will not be found 
in violation of the EU’s commitments under the GATS. It is also 
questionable whether an ex post, timewise protracted, case-by-case 
examination of alleged infringements can match the fluidity of the 
digital economy and the high stakes that are at hand. The CPTPP and 
the USMCA templates are modeled along the WTO norms but are 
linked to an even higher degree of uncertainty, as the legitimate 
objectives are not clearly spelled out. Coupled with the low privacy 
protection guarantees that these treaties provide, there seems to be a 
priority given to economic rights.323 Such a stance, although it may 
make economic sense and boost growth and innovation, may be 
unacceptable for some actors, such as the EU, which places a high value 
on fundamental rights and seeks to ensure their effective protection.324 
The EU has accordingly sought to export its high standards of 
protection through an extension of the territorial application of the 
GDPR and unilateral adequacy decisions that, short of international 
harmonization, provide an adequate level of protection of the EU 
citizens’ data.325 This unilateral approach, while justified on the side of 
the EU, may be linked to higher costs of compliance for foreign firms 
and countries, and may have negative implications for the EU’s 
economy and innovation capabilities in the era of Big Data and AI. One 
ingenious hybrid solution discussed above was the EU-US Privacy 
Shield as a flexible mechanism that reconciles the high standards of 
protection in the EU and the fairly low and fragmented levels of 
personal data protection in the US.326 The EU-US Privacy Shield is by 
no means perfect, as it fails to satisfy high demands of bindingness and 
enforceability and does not live up to the level of protection that the 
EU wishes to provide for its citizens, as confirmed by the Schrems 
judgments.327 However, the model has certain advantages: for example, 
there are working supervisory and remedy mechanisms, at least post-
Schrems I, and potentially now moving towards an enhanced agreement 
post-Schrems II. Moreover, under such an agreement, the EU does not 
require firms to establish a costly presence in the EU, and the 
assessment of conformity with the EU standards takes place at home 
by domestic regulators.328 It may thus be worthwhile to contemplate to 
 
322. See e.g., id. 
323. Id. 
324. European Parliament, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU, 
FACT SHEETS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION (2020). 
325. GDPR, supra note 31, at art. 45.  
326. Downes, supra note 129. 
327. Id. 
328. See id. 
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what extent such or similar mechanisms may be shaped in a more 
binding treaty form, which will provide legal certainty,329 and whether 
and how such mechanisms may be extended and made viable in 
plurilateral or multilateral contexts.330 While the current negotiations 
on electronic commerce under the auspices of the WTO reveal at this 
stage little agreement and willingness to move forward,331 preferential 
trade venues can serve as governance laboratories and pave the way 
towards regulatory cooperation and the possible implementation of the 
Privacy Shield model. Interoperability mechanisms can serve the data-
driven economy better than a multitude of carve-outs and exceptions.  
F. Concluding remarks: The present and future of 
the trade and privacy interface 
The contention between privacy and trade is by no means trivial, 
as on the one hand, fundamental individual rights and a nation’s 
informational sovereignty are at stake, while on the other hand, the 
present and the future of a data-driven economy bringing multiple 
benefits to societies needs to be considered. Ideally, one might think 
that a substantive harmonization of levels of protection would be the 
way to go and both scholars332 and policymakers333 have contemplated 
this path. Joel Reidenberger has in particular suggested that the 
harmonization of data protection laws can be based on the model of the 
 
329. Such a treaty could have superior legal force to EU regulations, such as 
the GDPR, but the defence through it the primary sources of EU law, 
such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, remains. See CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., supra note 171, at 13. 
330. See generally Aaditya Mattoo & Joshua P. Meltzer, Data Flows and 
Privacy: The Conflict and Its Resolution, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 769 (2018). 
331. See, e.g., Ines Willemyns, Agreement Forthcoming? A Comparison of EU, 
US, and Chinese RTAs in Times of Plurilateral E-Commerce 
Negotiations, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 221 (2020); Mira Burri, Towards a 
New Treaty on Digital Trade, 55 J. WORLD TRADE 71 (2021). 
332. See, e.g., David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic 
Divide? The US, the EU, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 
14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 220 (2016); David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, 
Transatlantic Negotiations for Transatlantic Rights: Why an EU-US 
Agreement Is the Best Option for Protecting Privacy against Cross-
Border Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY & TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS (David Cole et al. eds., 2017); Ian Brown, The Feasibility of 
Transatlantic Privacy-Protective Standards for Surveillance, 23 INT’L J. 
L. INFO. TECH. 23 (2015). 
333. See, e.g., Cannataci, supra note 58; see also Montreux Declaration: The 
Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in a Globalized World: a 
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WTO and move towards a General Agreement on Information 
Privacy;334 yet, looking at the current state of affairs at the WTO, 
despite the invigoration of e-commerce dedicated talks, such a proposal 
does not seem feasible.335 Some have also voiced concerns about perils 
along this path in case of an international accord, which might tilt 
heavily in favor of security-service preferences and in fact weaken 
privacy protection worldwide, so that “global privacy is likely to be 
better protected if domestic surveillance laws, especially those of the 
United States, are left to evolve on their own terms, without resort to 
a comprehensive multilateral framework.”336 Indeed, the reality of rule-
making on the interface of trade and privacy appears somewhat 
different than as previously perceived. We are faced with two realities: 
First, and something that is rather unspectacular in the area of 
cyberlaw, it appears, as it was prophesied early on, that while 
potentially “many aspects of the Net will be governed on a global 
scale,”337 “many Internet controversies are fast transforming into 
disputes among nations, and classic problems of international 
relations,” where “governments fight . . . one another to favor 
themselves, using the traditional tools of international politics and 
international law.”338 Second, and this is a reality that this article has 
made apparent, trade law, in particular deals struck in preferential 
venues, has become the plane where the contention of trade and privacy 
protection plays out and becomes gradually regulated. However, the 
direction that this regulation will take is uncertain, as we appear 
somewhat stuck between the diverging positions of the two main legal 
entrepreneurs — the US and the EU, as well as the highly protective 
stance of China. The question then is who will dominate, or rather, are 
we faced with a situation where despite the differences we will have 
more common themes across jurisdictions in due time. Here again, 
opinions differ. While many have argued that the “Brussels effect” is 
occurring and the EU is ratcheting up US domestic standards of 
protection,339 some have pointed to a more nuanced two-way 
relationship,340 which seems to inform both legal orders, actors’ 
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positioning, and enhance rule-diffusion.341 While a final statement on 
these diverging directions is still out, it appears clear and beneficial that 
levels of international cooperation are to be fostered, even through 
second-best mutual recognition solutions, such as the Privacy Shield 
Framework, which should not be perceived as weakening the sovereign 
state but rather as a logical response to the increased interdependence 
resulting from globalization and the spread of new communication 
technologies.342 
To conclude, one can underscore that privacy protection has clearly 
become a key topic on the trade negotiation tables and there is new 
and evolving rule-making that seeks to interface the demands of the 
digital economy to permit free flowing data and the sovereign wish to 
adequately safeguard the rights and values embedded in individual 
societies.343 Trade policy has the capacity to promote trade and 
innovation despite varying standards for privacy protection, but there 
is a strong demand for enhanced regulatory cooperation.344 As the 
complexity of the data-driven society rises, regulatory cooperation 
seems indispensable moving forward, since data issues cannot be 
addressed by the plain “lower tariffs, more commitments” stance in 
trade negotiations but instead demand effective reconciliation 
mechanisms and continuous oversight.345 At the same time, it appears 
that there will not be an “one-size-fits-all” solution, but rather a 
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